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THE GERMAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION

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THE GERMAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION

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SECRET

SUMMARY

1. The vast majority of German emigres throughout the world is not political but cultural and racial. The political emigration constitutes scarcely more than one or two percent of the 400,000 German emigres now concentrated principally in Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and South America. These organized German political refugee groups reflect the political environment of the countries in which they are living. The German trade unionists in Sweden are influenced by Swedish neutrality and their proximity to Nazi Germany. German Communists in Russia, whatever their private beliefs, are amenable to the pressure of Russian psychological warfare against Germany. German Socialists in the United States, responsive to American distrust of radical Socialism of any variety, use a democratic rather than Socialist phraseology. Notwithstanding the geographical dispersion and difficulties of wartime communication German political refugee groups in the various countries are in fairly close touch with one another.

2. The German political emigration has suffered the worst fate of all political refugees, that is to say, it has lost its vital contacts with and influence upon the underground opposition movements inside Germany.

3. Unlike the political refugees from the occupied countries such as Holland and Norway who have achieved a large measure of unity in their struggle for national liberation, unity among German political emigres is quite impossible, and to most groups undesirable. Unity among all anti-Nazi Germans is advocated only by the emigres of the German Communist Party and by conservative Democrats under the influence of the present policy of this party.

4. By accident or design the United States has become the principal place of refuge for emigres of the German political Right. Except for small groups, however, such as the Bavarian separatists, it is neither organized, nor active, nor vocal.

5. The organized German political emigration is for practical purposes equivalent to the parties of the old German Left, the Socialists and Communists. The violent quarrels among the emigre German Socialist groups are scarcely intelligible today except in the light of their competition with one another as underground organizations during the period from 1933 until 1940 when these organizations collapsed. During this period the Socialist Labor Party (SAP), the International Militant Socialists (ISK), and the Neu Beginnen group attacked the old Social Democratic Party (Sopade) and challenged the ability and authority of its leadership. These quarrels are now largely forgotten among the Socialist groups in London and Stockholm; they survive only in New York.

6. Intellectual leadership among all the principal German Socialist groups still resides in London where most of the organizations have their headquarters. Since 1941 the Union of German Socialist Organizations in Great Britain includes the Social Democratic Party, the SAP, the ISK, and Neu Beginnen. These groups have successfully collaborated in a number of projects for post-war Germany, the most important being their plan for a United Socialist party.

7. The German Fight for Freedom group, not a member of the London Union, has in the past year become one of the most influential groups of German political refugees in Great Britain. This group is an organization of German Socialist Vansittartists who believe that only the application of force can reconstruct Germany. They do not believe in the possiblity of any cooperation or assistance from groups in Germany. They deny the possibility of a German revolution and the existence of any national opposition inside Germany. They insist on a long period of military occupation and contend that the re-education of the German people is not a task for Germans themselves but for the United Nations. Although Socialists, the Fight for Freedom people are anti-revolutionary and anti-Communist. They are being supported by leading officials of the British Labor Party. In its June 1943 conference the British Labor Party has placed its stamp of approval on the program of the Fight for Freedom group. The British Trade Union Congress, however, has not followed its example.

8. In Sweden all German Socialist groups, including the Communists, cooperate in Fritz Tarnow's Arbeitskreis. Tarnow, a conservative Social Democrat with authoritarian leanings, has latterly capitulated to the more radical program of the SAP under the leadership of August Enderle. In Sweden, however, it is the German trade unionists, not the political parties, that play a dominant role in the German political emigration.

9. Only in the United States does the bitter strife between the German Labor Delegation, an organization of prominent former Social Democratic officeholders, and the Neu Beginnen group continue. This quarrel is less a quarrel over the controversial personality of Paul Hagen than a re-enactment on American soil of the old quarrel between the Social Democratic Party and its dissident Socialist groups dating from the early days of the German underground movement. The German Labor Delegation exercises a considerable influence over the German Socialist emigration in the United States through its control over the editorial policies of the Neue Volkszeitung, while Paul Hagen and Neu Beginnen have attracted many of the most active German Socialist emigres in the United States.

10. Notwithstanding the survival of some of these old quarrels there exists today a substantial unity among the principal German Socialist groups in Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States on many of the major problems of post-war Germany. Nowhere do German Socialists include in their organizations Austrian Socialists and nowhere have they any dealings with the Sudeten German Social Democrats. There is no discernible interest in frontier problems. All German Socialist

groups agree on the necessity of a social revolution as the prime condition for the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany. The London Union, the German Trade Unionists in Sweden, Paul Hagen's Neu Beginnen, and even the majority of the German Labor Delegation, demand an immediate socialization of German heavy industry, the banking system, and the break-up of the landed estates of the Junkers. They desire a Germany that will cooperate on friendly terms with both the Western democracies and the Soviet Union and oppose the division of Europe into spheres of interest. A few Socialists among these groups are federalists but a majority of them are centralists.

11. The German Communist Party, as the most numerous, most highly disciplined and best organized party of the German emigration, is the only German emigre party that must be taken seriously. It no longer appears in the open as a German Communist Party but as a group of anti-Fascist Germans who are seeking to bring into a common organization all anti-Nazis in Germany and in the German emigration on an exclusively democratic program. In this it has been most successful in Great Britain, Mexico, and, presumably in Russia. If we are to take German Communists at their word, the KPD has for the moment abandoned its program of Communism and of a single-party dictatorship. Yet it retains its old organization, its old party leaders, and its close association with the Communist Party and the leaders of the Soviet Union, even after the dissolution of the Comintern. At the present moment there exists a kind of truce between the German Communist Party and the various Socialist groups, particularly in Great Britain. Because of their unity program Communists do not openly attack Socialists, and cordial discussions between members of the two parties are taking place. German Socialists are not yet convinced of the complete independence of the KPD from Moscow, and the Communist disruption tactics of the past years have not been forgotten. German Socialist groups of all countries have not concealed their distrust of the Freies Deutschland committees of Mexico City, Moscow, and London, and of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943. They do not like the prominence of the old Communist Party leaders on these committees and above all they do not want a coalition with military personnel which occupies so conspicuous a place in the propaganda of the Free German Committee of Moscow.

SECRET

I. GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION

The vast majority of German refugees throughout the world is not political but racial and cultural. The actual political emigration constitutes scarcely more than one or two percent of the 400,000 German emigres now concentrated principally in Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States and South America. Of the 110,000 German refugees in the United States no more than 400 to 500 are politically organized and active. Notwithstanding this geographical dispersion and the difficulties of communication resulting from it, the organized emigre groups in the countries indicated are in fairly close touch with one another. The emigre groups in London are in regular communication with their corresponding groups in Sweden, New York and South America. Plans for post-war Germany drafted by German trade unionists in Sweden are discussed and criticized in London and New York. Money collected from the Jewish Labor Committee by Social Democrats in New York contributes to the support of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party (Sopade) in London. German Communists in Mexico are kept well informed of the activity of their Communist comrades in Great Britain and Russia and of fellow traveller organizations in the United States. After nearly four years of warfare the patterns of organization, thought, and activity among German emigres have sufficiently crystallized to permit some kind of analysis.

II. POLITICAL DISUNITY IN THE GERMAN EMIGRATION

To speak of factional quarrels among German political refugees is merely to say that they are emigres. They share these psychological traits, in an intensified form, with the emigres of other countries. Yet, between German political exiles and those of the occupied countries there is a fundamental difference. In the occupied countries at home and among their emigres it is the Left that has borne the brunt of the struggle against Hitler, while the conservative and nationalist Right provided the chief hotbeds of defeatism and quisling intrigues. In the occupied countries the Left is today performing the function which traditionally belonged to the domain of the Right -- the maintenance of the spirit of national unity and keeping alive national consciousness. Yet in Norway, Poland, Holland, and Czechoslovakia and their respective emigrations the struggle is less one for a social revolution than for national liberation. In the emigre groups of these countries ideological divisions which separate the former political parties have become blurred in the face of the common struggle for national unity and liberation. Even the Socialists and Communists have become nationalist in their struggle for political liberation against the enemy. This circumstance is making cooperation with German emigre groups extremely difficult.

For the German political emigration, however, the struggle against Hitler is a political struggle for a total change of system inside Germany. Political principles and party lines are, therefore, for the moment, of greater importance for German refugees than they are for Poles and Dutchmen. For German political refugees a national unity such as the Dutch and Norwegians have achieved is quite impossible. To some political groups it is not even desirable. There is little common ground between Dr. Heinrich Bruening who desires a monarchist restoration and the left wing German Socialists who consider a social revolution an essential preliminary to the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany, or the Bavarian separatists in the United States who, contending that National Socialism cuts across the divisions of all social classes, seek a solution in the dismemberment of Germany into sovereign states loosely federated with one another. In the opinion of German Socialists of all persuasions a united anti-Nazi front of all emigres would merely provide German Communists with a playground for their infiltration and disruption tactics.

It is, therefore, only the German Communist Party and its fellow-travellers that, in obedience to orders from Moscow, seek a union of all anti-Nazi Germans irrespective of their former political affiliations. On this point the German emigre Communists in Sweden, Great Britain, and Mexico are in complete agreement with Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld's Communist front organization, the German American Emergency Conference. Everywhere German Communists are proclaiming the same doctrine of unity among all political emigres and the suspension of all ideological quarrels among parties until Hitler's collapse has prepared the ground for a revival of German democracy. So long as the German Communists everywhere remain a close and highly disciplined party committed to a dictatorship of the Party and subject to the orders of their leader, Wilhelm Pieck, in Moscow, the difficulties in the way of cooperation between

between them and the German Socialist groups will remain all but insuperable. In Great Britain and Latin America German Communists have had a very large measure of success in persuading German exiles of other parties to become members of anti-Nazi organizations controlled by them. The Free German League for Culture in Great Britain, the largest organization of anti-Nazi Germans anywhere, is controlled by German Communists.

In all countries German Socialists are still challenging the independence of the German Communist Party from Moscow, more vigorously since the dissolution of the Comintern than before. Everywhere, not even excepting Sweden where Fritz Tarnow has included German Communists in his Arbeitsgemeinschaft of 200 German trade unionists, German Socialists deny that Communists have suddenly abandoned their doctrine of dictatorship by the Communist Party in favor of the democratic process. Indeed, the right wing of the German Labor Delegation in New York as represented by Albert Grzesinski, Gerhart Seger and his Neue Volkszeitung, Max Brauer and Rudolf Katz sees in the German Communists enemies more deadly even than National Socialism itself, because the triumph of Communism in Germany means the end of their political existence.

III. THE SOCIALIST UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS, 1933-1939

By accident or design the United States has become the place of refuge for the German Right. Yet these conservative democrats and monarchists consisting for the most part of businessmen, bankers, attorneys, former office-holders and diplomats, are neither organized nor politically active. They meet, if they meet at all, only in the non-political Study Center, established in New York by Dr. Hans Staudinger, for more or less academic discussions. It is a notable fact that none of the former German middle class or conservative parties have survived in the emigration. There is, to be sure, the Free German Committee in London, composed of former Democrats and conservative Social Democrats like Karl Hoeltermann, Dr. August Weber, and Dr. Ernst Meyer, which aims at the re-establishment of a German Democratic Party, but it plays no discernible political role. The German Confessional Institute, composed of pastors of the German Confessional Church in London, is more concerned with religion than with politics. The former Center Party also has no organization in the emigration. Dr. Kaas, its former leader, is now in the Vatican and Dr. Heinrich Bruening, whatever his personal plans, persistently refuses affiliation with any emigre political movement. Only Dr. Carl Spiecker, next to Dr. Bruening the most prominent former Centrist politician, promises that when Germany is defeated the old Center Party will be on the scene. The German Catholic Club of Great Britain, democratic and anti-Marxist in its views, is the nearest approach to an organization of German Catholics in exile. Unique is the small but growing Bavarian Council in New York, a group of German "separatists" who profess to be non-clerical and democratic and seek the establishment of a federation of German states without Prussia. Led by Dr. Frederick Proewig, a former Hanoverian, and Rev. von Soden (who has recently died) of the Bavarian People's Party, it includes the Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria who now passes by the name of Mr. Bayern, Annette Kolb, an Alsatian, and Klaus Dohrn, a Pomeranian Catholic. All of these groups, however, are numerically small and without a press and play no significant role in the international German emigration.

The German political emigration, therefore, is for practical purposes equivalent to the German Left. It is only the political groups and parties of the German Left that are organized, possess a press or retain remnants of their former underground organizations.

Broadly speaking, any group of exiles who are politically active on behalf of a particular program for their home country may be called political emigres. Technically, however, only that part of the German political emigration may be described as the German Opposition abroad which either represents or has had authentic connections with actual opposition groups in Germany. Since the most significant sector of the German political emigration is a product of the various underground movements which developed between 1933 and 1940, the question --who represents and who has or has had contacts with political opposition groups inside Germany? -- is a matter of crucial importance. These questions go to the center of the quarrels and resentments that have arisen between the various German Socialist groups since 1933. Without a brief historical account of these quarrels between the various Socialist underground movements, their present behavior must remain largely unintelligible.

The largest mass party among these underground movements, the German Social Democratic Party, established its Executive Committee (Parteivorstand), commonly referred to as the Sopade, in Prague in 1933 to continue its underground operations from there. Since 1920 the political activity of this party had been dominated by the Social Democratic trade unions, its most effective pressure group. Its leaders were almost without exception reformists and opportunists. They were relatively helpless in the face of both the German industrialists and the leaders of the Reichswehr. Confronted with the rising power of Hitler, their prime concern was to keep their party organization intact. Many of its ablest leaders remained at home after the dissolution of the party and withdrew from public life. Those who went into exile were typical of the Social Democratic Old Guard. They were either former ministers or prominent officeholders like Albert Grzesinski, Wilhelm Sollmann, Max Brauer, now in New York, or approved party bureaucrats like Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, and Wilhelm Sander, now in London, or trade union leaders like Fritz Tarnow, now in Sweden, Hans Gottfureht, now in London, and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, now in New York, or editors of Social Democratic newspapers like Friedrich Stempfer, Gerhart Seger, Toni Sender, now in New York, and many of them were former members of the Reichstag. Two of the ablest of them, Breitscheid and Hilferding were turned over to the Gestapo with 300 others by the Vichy Government on 10 Feb. 1941. A considerable number of these people is now over sixty years old; they fought in the last war and are nationalists, are hostile to left wing Socialists, and uncompromising enemies of the German Communist Party. They represent for the most part the old Majority Socialists, while a large number of the old Independent Socialists (USPD) have deserted to the groups farther to the left.

The Sopade claimed to be the legal representative of the Social Democratic Party in exile, although such a claim could be considered valid only so long as an organized Social Democratic Party in Germany did not exist. It may be considered reasonably certain that no remnants of the former organization of this party still survive in Germany in 1943. Yet in the debates among German Socialist emigres the Sopade has always, until recently, taken the position that the party in Germany has survived all Gestapo efforts to disrupt it. It must be remembered, however, that the Sopade had to fight in two directions, against the Nazi regime and against Communist infiltration into its own ranks. The dissident Socialist groups, however, contended that the old party was dead and buried and could no longer be revived. Managed by veteran party bureaucrats, who had no existence outside of the party, it is perhaps intelligible that in exile the Sopade should exaggerate the importance of its party organization even more than before Hitler's accession to power.

This peculiar legalistic position of the Sopade, to the effect that it alone represented the old Social Democratic Party in Germany, was bound to provoke vigorous opposition from groups less concerned with legality than with the ability and intelligence of leadership in the underground struggle against the Nazi regime. Discontent with the old Social Democratic leaders was widespread, if not general, and eventually caused a larger number of defections from the Sopade than from any other surviving Socialist group. There are today

no more than 160 registered members of the Social Democratic Party in all Great Britain, while the number of emigres who voted as Social Democrats in 1933 is three and four times greater. The number of defections in the United States is greater still. Perhaps these quarrels between the various Socialist groups would have been less acute, had not the Sopade salvaged substantial funds from Germany, which it now claimed the sole right to administer. When the Sopade cut off its funds from a particular Socialist group a war to the knife was inevitable.

From the ranks of the disaffected there emerged new groups who challenged the ability and legitimacy of Sopade leadership and conducted their own underground struggle against Hitler. Among these dissident groups it is only the Neu Beginnen group which has survived in Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States, the other group, the German Revolutionary Socialists, which is reported to have survived in Great Britain, seems to have no other members than S. Retzlaw, its founder. There is no evidence of the survival of the Red Shocktroops in 1943. Besides these, there were other independent Socialist groups which had separated themselves from the Social Democratic Party before Hitler came to power: the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP), led by Paul Froehlich and Jakob Walcher, now in the United States, and by August Enderle, now in Sweden: and the Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund (ISK) or League of Militent International Socialists, led by Willy Eichler, now in London.

The SAP was formed in the summer of 1931 when a group of left wing Social Democrats and Communists seceded from their respective parties. From the beginning the SAP was anti-militarist and anti-nationalist and placed the emphasis on Marxism as the lifeblood of Socialist statesmanship. The party was and is in many ways comparable to the old Independent Socialists (Unabhangige Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands) and many members of this group, like Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld (recently died), now in the United States, joined the SAP. They are sometimes called Trotzkyites by Social Democrats, although Paul Walter in London and Jakop Walcher in the United States emphatically deny this. The SAP played no major role in German national affairs. All the greater was its influence in the local municipal councils and in the State parliaments. The party had its strongest following in Silesia, in Saxony, in the industrial regions about Frankfort-am-Main and in Duesseldorff. There are few intellectuals among them, most of them being trade unionists. Approximately 150 SAP members and leaders went into exile in 1933.

The largest and most active SAP group is now in Sweden, where approximately fifty of them, with August Enderle at their head, have been welcomed into Fritz Tarnow's Arbeitskreis. In London the thirty SAP members, led by Paul Walter, are members of the "Union." The least active SAP group is that in the United States, where there are about twenty members. Here they are neither organized nor active as a group, largely because many of them are here on a visitor's visa. Individually and as a group they support Neu Beginnen.

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The ISK group was founded by Professor Leonard Nelson of Göttingen in the twenties. Dr. Nelson established an international school of political science at the Walkemuehle, near the city of Cassel, to propagandize his non-Marxian Socialism. Numerically, ISK was never important even in Germany, and there are no more than 100 members in the entire German emigration. Thanks, however, to Nelson's school at the Walkemuehle, which was attended by young Socialists from many countries, no German emigre group has better connections with international socialist groups than ISK. The largest unit of ISK, composed of about forty members, is now in Great Britain where it is under the leadership of Willi Eichler. W. Heidorn, formerly active in underground work, is his close collaborator. Another member, Minna Specht, works on German post-war educational problems for the Fabian Society. The London ISK group, also a member of the "Union," is closely associated with the Socialist Vanguard Group in the British Labor Party which publishes the monthly Socialist Commentary. In the United States Miss Eva Levinsky-Pfister and Erna Blencke are the two best known members of ISK. In Buenos Aires Dr. Hans Lehmann, a member of ISK, is associated with Dr. August Siemsen, the editor of Das Andere Deutschland.

The smallest of these groups is probably the Neu Beginnen group, with approximately 100 original members in the emigration. In London and New York, however, it has a high percentage of fellow-travellers. This group will be discussed more extensively later in this memorandum.

These groups were even better suited to underground operations than the mass party of the Social Democrats. They were very much smaller and had developed a special kind of party leadership. A mass party, operating openly and legally in a democracy, requires able administrators and parliamentarians, orators, and journalists who can influence the masses and mobilize voters. But an illegal or underground political organization has little use for these specific skills. Successful underground activity requires shrewd, bold, disciplined men, men of iron nerves who can keep their heads while under Gestapo observation. The SAP, ISK and Neu Beginnen groups were originally composed oa a young, bold and carefully selected elite. They adopted a more rigorous discipline and a stricter rule of secrecy than the Sopade. They were opposed to the mass underground operations of the Social Democrats, the remnants of whose organizations were pretty thoroughly liquidated by 1935. Otto Bauer, the Austrian Socialist leader and a close observer of German underground organizations, offers in his Die Illegale Partei a graphic description of the all but complete disruption of the mass underground movement of the Social Democrats. Only after 1936 did the Sopade underground regain some of its former importance. The rival Socialist groups, on the other hand, developed what has been aptly called the cadre party, which, cut free from direct contact with the laboring masses, placed emphasis on the training and discipline of a carefully selected elite.

Inevitably, perhaps, the mentality of these groups became sectarian. They were exclusive and contemptuous alike of the reformism of the Social Democratic Party as they were of the German Communists who slavishly obeyed every instruction

from Moscow. The bitter resentments dating from their quarrels with the Sopade in the early days of the underground movement still survive, in some countries more noticeably than in others. The Sopade accused them, notably the SAP and Neu Beginnen, the most vigorous of these groups, of being conspiratorial secret societies, of secretly forming cells of their supporters within the Social Democratic Party, or of being parties which, like the Communist Party, really aimed at an undemocratic party dictatorship. Some of these charges can be substantiated today. These groups on the other hand charged the Sopade with wasting its funds on an expensive organization in Prague, with being reckless and wasteful in its underground operations, with unreflective opportunistic leadership, and with responsibility for the destruction of the Weimar Republic by their political bungling.

Between 1933 and 1939 all these dissident Socialist groups passed through a series of structural and ideological changes, many of which merely reflect the changes in the general political situation during these dramatic years. Since the all but complete suppression of the German underground movement in 1940 and 1941 these quarrels have lost much of their former meaning. Most of these groups have since abandoned their exclusiveness and secrecy, although their critical attitude toward the old Social Democratic leaders remains undiminished. If the Neu Beginnen group was committed to the principle of party dictatorship in 1934 under the leadership of Loewenheim-Miles, it professes to be even more democratic in its outlook today under the leadership of Loewenthal-Sering in London and Frank-Hagen in the United States than the Social Democratic Party itself. Cut off in 1934 from the funds of the Social Democratic Party by the Executive Committee, these groups developed financial resources of their own, resources which in the end were greater than those of the Sopade. They won the financial support of Czechoslovak, Swiss, and British Socialists, of Leon Blum himself, and obtained enormous sums from the United States.

IV. THE UNION OF GERMAN SOCIALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN

Although still smouldering, the quarrels between these left wing groups, the SAP, ISK, Neu Beginnen and the Sopade are least acute in Great Britain. In Great Britain all of these groups cooperate since March, 1941, on an equal basis with the Sopade in the Union of German Socialist Organizations. Despite the fact that it was imposed upon them by Sir William Gillies, the International Secretary of the British Labor Party, because of his difficulties in having to deal with so many German Socialist groups, the Union has succeeded in winning the active support of all its member units.

The Social Democratic Party, with its 160 registered members, dominates the Union. Hans Vogel, the chairman of its Executive Committee, is also chairman of the Union, although all groups are equally represented on its policy committee. The British Labor Party still adheres to the formal fact that only the Social Democratic Party was a member of the Labor and Socialist International, and that consequently only the Social Democratic Party can be recognized as the official representation of German Labor. The British Labor Party supports the Sopade financially. In the Spring of 1943, however, it withdrew the salary of Erich Ollenhauer, the Secretary of the Youth Section of the party, on the ground that his work was not essential to the war effort. Since then the American Jewish Labor Committee, at the request of the German Labor Delegation in New York, contributes largely to the support of the London Sopade. But for this financial support from the United States the London Sopade could scarcely survive. Even so it maintains neither an office nor a secretarial staff. The meager Sozialistische Mitteilungen, published in mimeograph form once a month, are no substitute for a party press.

These financial difficulties are merely a reflection of the general loss of prestige of the Social Democratic Party in Great Britain. Most of the leaders of the British Labor Party support the rival Fight For Freedom group which is not a member of the Union. Except for John Middleton, Harold Laski and Walter Schevenels, the Sopade has few cordial friends in Britain. In his annual report on the activities of the Social Democratic Party which Ollenhauer sent to Friedrich Stampfer in March, 1943, the former regretfully admits that "we have been unable to overcome this opposition to us." It must be stated, however, that the same divisions characteristic of German emigre Socialists are to be found also in the British Labor Party.

The conspicuous absence of men of constructive statesmanship and intellectual ability among the Social Democrats in Great Britain has been frequently commented upon. The tragic failure of the German Republic had been in the first instance a failure of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, the strongest political organization in the country. They had lost initiative in domestic affairs to the Catholic Centre Party and in foreign policy to Gustav Stresemann of the People's Party, and had developed into moderate progressives confined to a narrow range of reforms dealing chiefly with certain time-honored trade union demands. Cast into exile, there was no change of leadership. Otto Wels, the

first chairman of the all-powerful Party Executive in Exile, was a courageous and able manipulator of the party machine. After his death, there was a noticeable decline in the leadership of the Sopade. Hans Vogel, the present chairman, is no doubt an amiable and reasonable gentleman, but scarcely equal to the tremendous problems that face a revolutionary leader in exile. His immediate lieutenants, Erich Ollenhauer, B. F. Heine, and Wilhelm Sander are loyal party men, whom no one has yet regarded as formidable political leaders who might direct an eventual German revolution.

The Social Democratic Party in exile has not recovered from the loss of its ablest intellectuals, Breitscheid and Hilferding in 1941. Otto Braun, the venerable Prime Minister of Prussia, is in Switzerland and, except for occasional communications, out of touch with the London group. Some of the ablest Social Democrats in Great Britain, like Curt Geyer, have deserted, or, like the five members of the original Party Executive, emigrated to the United States. Among those who remain B. F. Heine stands out as one of the ablest and most active.

Only about 80 of the 160 registered members of the Social Democratic Party live in London. The rest are scattered over the country wherever the special restrictions for enemy aliens permit them to live. This London group has an organization of its own under the chairmanship of Wilhelm Sander. This organization, however, is distinct from the formally elected Executive Committee of the party, composed of Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, and B. F. Heine. In the past two years different tendencies within the party have taken a more or less definite shape. One group of a more conservative tendency gathers around Ollenhauer and Sander. There is another group, represented by Victor Schiff, one of the editors of the Vorwaerts, and Walter Kolarz, with more pronounced leftist leanings. There is little or nothing that separates the latter from the SAP and Neu Beginnen. All three of the other member groups of the Union -- ISK, SAP, Neu Beginnen -- have a relatively high percentage of fellow travellers among Social Democrats.

In the past year the Union rather than the Social Democratic Party has become the more active organization. The most important function of the Party Executive is to issue once a month a news letter, the Sozialistische Mitteilungen. This news letter, issued in 500 copies, is the only connecting link among the German Social Democrats scattered throughout the world. The lack of financial resources has hitherto not permitted the publication of a regular party organ. Their London leaders have been frequently compelled to resort to the New York Neue Volkszeitung for the publication of their speeches. Ollenhauer's report on the year 1942 mentions a number of mimeographed publications, most of them by B. F. Heine, which the Party Executive has issued: Judicial Terror in Nazi Germany; Reflections on the Restoration of the Social Democratic Press; Proposal For Food Distribution in Germany After the War; and a reply to the accusations made by the Geyer-Loeb Fight For Freedom Group.

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Among the relations of the London Social Democrats with other national refugee groups, those with the Czechoslovak Government in Exile are most cordial. German Social Democrats have not forgotten the hospitality which for many years the Czechs had given them. It is moreover a fundamental point with them not to recognize any of Hitler's annexations. Consequently, they do not regard the various Sudeten German groups as belonging to the German emigration. As a result Wenzel Jaksch's Sudeten German Social Democratic Party with approximately 900 members is not affiliated with any organization of Reichs-German political emigres. This correct behavior has earned for German Social Democrats the support of the Benes Government.

Ollenhauer's report desires to convey the impression that the Party Executive's contacts with underground workers in Germany have not been entirely cut off. He refers to facilities which British friends have given them to reopen contacts with illegal workers in neutral countries around Germany. But he complains of the lack of resources and of suitable workers in Great Britain. The London group of Social Democrats is convinced that it is impossible to gain any greater influence over the underground opposition in Germany without an organized press and a news service. The German Labor Delegation in New York is now making strenuous efforts to obtain the necessary funds from the War Chest of the A.F. of L. to establish such a press.

Neu Beginnen has but twelve members in London, but it maintains close connections with the British Socialist Clarity Group, and its guiding spirit, Richard Loewenthal (alias Paul Sering) is one of the ablest German Marxian Socialists in Great Britain and a frequent contributor to the Labor Discussion Notes and The Left News. It also has a relatively high percentage of fellow-travellers in London. Since the members of the official Sopade are unable to provide the rank and file of its members with authoritative leadership, intellectual leadership at least is passing to such men as Loewenthal-Sering. Through his numerous publications, particularly through his recent book Klare Fronten, he is extending his influence beyond the older dissident Socialist groups far into the ranks of the otherwise leaderless Social Democrats. If his radical tendencies still cause some uneasiness among the older Social Democrats, Erwin Karl Schoettle, a former Social Democrat and now secretary of the Neu Beginnen Auslandsbüro, has done his utmost to dissipate Social Democratic doubts on the democratic character of the Neu Beginnen program in his recent Neu Beginnen Wie Es Wurde. There is no major or minor quarrel between the Sopade and the Neu Beginnen group in London.

Conspicuous among German Socialists in England is the leader of the ISK group, Willi Eichler, who together with his able collaborator, W. Heidorn, published the periodical Europe Speaks until the spring of 1943. Alarmed by the intellectual isolation of German Socialists, Eichler has cultivated relations with French, British, Polish, and Czech Socialists -- with very modest results. Notwithstanding his close contacts with the French underground movement and with Henri Hauck, his pamphlet Calling All Europe, published

late in 1942, ends on the pessimistic note: No prospect for a social revolution in Germany or for a real unity of Europe. Eichler's present greatest fear is the possibility that Socialists, misled by the democratic propaganda of the Communists, might yield to the temptation to cooperate with the German Communist Party. Cooperation with the German Communists, he argues, must be fatal to German democratic Socialism of any kind. In the hope of laying this ghost which haunts every German democratic Socialist, he published early in 1943 his Russland und die Komintern, which is a bulky record of the deceptions, the dishonesty and the untrustworthiness of German Communists since the rise of Hitler. Eichler's unrelenting campaign against collaboration with the KPD has had a measure of success in England and in Buenos Aires, where his lieutenant, Dr. Hans Lehmann, prevailed upon Dr. August Siemsen, the editor of Das Andere Deutschland, to break off relations with Paul Merker and the Latin American Committee in Mexico.

We know very little of the present role of Paul Walter and the thirty members of SAP in the London Union. On Russia's entry into the war, they published a leaflet demanding support for Russia and stating that a united front with Communists was desirable but at the moment impracticable. There is no evidence that they have changed their position in this matter. Hans Vogel is particularly proud of having secured the cooperation of the London SAP group.

Closely associated with the London Union is the German Trade Union Center, under its chairman Hans Gottfurcht. This Trade Union for all Germans working in Great Britain is affiliated with the I.F.T.U. and the T.U.C. The composition of its Executive Committee (W. Derkow; K. Doberer; Willi Eichler; Anna Beyer, ISK; Herta Gotthelf; W. Sander, SPD; E. Schoettle, NB; Paul Walter, SAP; C. Weckel, SAP) is also indicative of the growing influence of the left wing Socialist groups in the Union. The Trade Union Center is non-partisan. It has recently opened its ranks to all German trade unionists irrespective of their former political affiliations, including the Communists. When the ban on the Communists was lifted its membership rose from 420 to 650. The Communist claim of a majority in this Trade Union Center is probably exaggerated. According to one report 50 percent of its members belong to the groups of the Union, 25 percent are Communists or fellow travellers, and 25 percent are young people with a considerable number of Communists among them.

This brief review of the member groups of the London Union is sufficient to indicate that a preponderance of influence, if not of numbers, has shifted to the members of the dissident Socialist groups and to left wing Social Democrats. This decided leftward swing of German Socialists in Britain is documented also in the one serious project that has emerged from the common discussions of the member groups of the London Union: the first draft of a plan for a united German Socialist party (Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben Einer Geeinten Sozielistischen Partei in Deutschland, completed early in December 1942).

Whether or not this plan originated in the Sopade is unknown or, perhaps, unimportant. The fact remains that this document, accepted by all the member groups of the Union, bears the unmistakable imprint of the left wing Socialist groups. Writing about this plan to Erich Rinner, Hans Vogel stated, "Events in Russia have brought us German Socialists together." The basis for this agreement was provided less by the Social Democratic Party than by the left wing member groups of the Union, one of the reasons why it caused consternation among the right wing members of the German Labor Delegation in New York. The program of this document is essentially the program of the SAP and Neu Beginnen. In it the Sopade admits that it is no longer possible or even desirable to revive the old Social Democratic Party in its pre-1933 form. Membership in the new party cannot be determined by membership in the old one. Instead there must be a new party with new leaders, that will absorb all the former left wing dissident groups, including former Communists who have been active in the underground movement. This marks a surrender of the legalistic position which the Sopade had taken since 1933.

The program also calls for an immediate social revolution (einen tiefen Eingriff in die alte gesellschaftliche Ordnung). More specifically, it demands the expropriation of the large landowners, heavy industrialists, bankers and finance capitalists, the elimination of both Nazi and reactionary civil servants, the destruction of militarism, in a word a thorough democratization of German economic and political life. The document declares that a new German democracy is impossible without the social revolution which this program postulates.

There exist three other small German emigre Socialist groups in Great Britain which are not members of the Union. The most important of these are the Volkssozialisten, under the leadership of Hans Jaeger, with approximately twenty members. The political doctrine of this group is that Socialism cannot be achieved by basing the movement on labor groups alone. Their program is reminiscent of Otto Strasser's Schwarze Front, and while they lived in Czechoslovakia, these people maintained close relations with Otto Strasser. Some of their members are still admirers of Otto Strasser, although it is not known whether any contacts still exist. It is known, on the other hand, that the Volkssozialisten maintain close contacts with the members of the Union and with the Fight For Freedom group who denounce Otto Strasser as a Fascist. They are favorably disposed to the Union's plan for a united Socialist party.

Definitely unimportant is Kurt Hiller's Freiheitsbund Deutscher Sozialisten which has no more than four or five members in Great Britain and one or two in Sweden. Hiller is generally described as a harmless political eccentric with left wing views. He was formerly the leader of the so-called Revolutionary Pacifists in Germany. He has recently issued a declaration which advocates a non-Marxian Socialism. The formation of a Socialist elite, the complete disarmament of Germany after the war, and reparations by the Germans for all crimes committed by the Hitler regime. He is also in favor of the plan for a united Socialist party.

Finally, there is the Bund Deutscher Revolutionärer Sozialisten of S. Retzlaw and Karl Groehl. Retzlaw is an old Spartacist who is now on bad terms with his former party friends. Together with the Volkssozialisten and some other people. Retzlaw founded in September, 1942, the Klub der Konstruktivisten. What holds most of these people together is their common opposition to the old Social Democratic Party and its program of a centralized Germany. These people are the only open federalists among the Socialists of the German emigration. They contend that the problem of destroying the roots of German militarism can be solved only by destroying the territorial unity of Prussia and by giving to the new Germany a federal structure. So long as Prussia with its population of 40 millions remains intact, they argue, Germany's neighbors will not feel secure. They add that German Socialists will not be able to guarantee security to Germany's neighbors, because after ten years of systematic murder of Socialists by the Gestapo, there will be no Socialists left in Germany. They contend that a Germany with a federal structure need not necessarily become reactionary. Retzlaw argues that while the Social Democrats have frequently admitted that centralism has always been the chief source of German imperialism, they lack the courage to come out with a frankly federalist program.

V. THE GERMAN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM GROUP IN LONDON

In no country do German refugees of the Social Democratic Party occupy a more difficult position than in Great Britain, despite the financial support of the British Labor Party. This is in some measure the fault of their London leaders. It is also due to the situation itself. The expectation of a revolution in Germany, exaggerated in the early years of the war, has now vanished in London. With it has vanished also much of the credit which the German emigration enjoyed. While British workers warmed up to German Communists because of their forthright pro-Russianism, German Socialists wrote critical, if not hostile, pamphlets on the subject to Russia. Whenever occasion for public speaking was offered, German Social Democrats dwelt on the "other Germany" which they affected to represent, and emphasized the importance of the underground movement in Germany, although they could produce little compelling evidence of its strength. Their "underground" sources, however, were largely derived from the German press. Attacked both from the Right and the Left, they were on the defensive, and their defensive speeches had the ring of a curious kind of German nationalism. The news got out that they were hedging on the principle of the unilateral disarmament of Germany. Rightly or wrongly, this lack of a clear position on the issues of the war stirred up suspicion not only among Englishmen but among certain German emigres.

These hesitations produced what at first appeared to be nothing more than another squabble within the German emigration. As time went on, however, this quarrel matured into the most serious secession from the Social Democratic Party that has yet occurred. The Fight For Freedom group came into existence in the spring of 1942 when six members, among them Curt Geyer, one of the oldest and most prominent, deserted from the Social Democratic Party. The originator and the guiding spirit of the group was Walter Loeb, a former German banker and company promoter. Equipped with ample funds, they formed a publishing company known as "Fight For Freedom Editorial and Publishing Services, Ltd." This small group of German emigres acquired political importance when Walter Loeb succeeded in enlisting the active support not only of Lord and Lady Vansittart but of such prominent and respected officials of the British Labor Party as Alfred Dobbs, its chairman, James Walker, a former chairman, and Sir William Gillies, the International Secretary of the Labor Party. With such support behind him, Walter Loeb addressed his appeal to the German emigres. In December 1942, he invited a large number of German Socialist emigres to a round table conference at the Savoy Hotel. His appeal failed utterly. Besides the original six members not a single German Socialist emigre has joined the group. Loeb, however, did succeed in obtaining the blessing of a number of prominent continental Socialists, among them Camille Huysmans of Belgium and chairman of the defunct Second International, W. Malinowsky of Poland, Jacobus Oldenbroek of Holland, Gustav Winter of Czechoslovakia, Finn Moe of Norway, and others.

In spite of this Socialist and international window dressing the Fight For Freedom is in reality an organization of German Vansittartists. We are not here concerned with the position of Lord Vansittart in British politics. His position on the German problem can be rapidly summarized. He regards

Hitler not as an accident in German history but as its culmination. The "other Germany" is an illusion which never existed save in a small and ineffective minority which has never been able to assert itself in war or peace. The rest, he states in his Lessons of My Life, are stricken with the blight of arrogance, dishonesty, and militarism. These call for the defeat, de-militarization, occupation, and re-education of Germany; beyond that he postulates a prosperous but not powerful Germany. There is no evidence that he ever advocated the dismemberment of Germany. This is also the position of the Fight For Freedom group, although in many of their writings Vansittartism is as far removed from Lord Vansittart as Marxism is from Karl Marx.

No doubt, honestly inspired by the fear of some kind of appeasement, the Geyer-Loeb group emphasized the fact that this is less a war against the Axis Powers than a national war against Germany. Germany not Hitler is the real enemy. Aggressive German nationalism and militarism infect not merely the National Socialists but the entire German people, and it is they who must be fought and punished. Presently, however, this criticism turned against the German emigration itself which they charged with aggressive nationalism. Like Lord Vansittart, they insisted that henceforth there be a definite limit to the attention commanded "by insidious and untrustworthy German exiles." The principal object of their attack was German Social Democracy. They sometimes had recourse to dubious tactics. Obviously inspired by Walter Loeb, the London Sunday Dispatch of 8 February, 1942 published an article under the headlines: "The 'Free German' trick, an exposure of influential emigre groups working in Great Britain to save Germany."

In the most serious of their publications, Gollancz in German Wonderland, Geyer-Loeb accused the German Social Democrats of evasions, subterfuges, and untruthfulness in what concerned Republican Germany between 1920 and 1933. They denounced the obstinate self-justification of the Social Democratic leaders in exile and particularly of Gerhart Seger's Neue Volkszeitung in New York, and excoriated their sentimental defense of the German people as a falsification of facts. They accused the Social Democratic leaders in London and New York of aggressive German nationalism, of contempt for the Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs, and of placing the national interests of the Reich above considerations of international security and justice. In the spring and summer of 1942 the Fight For Freedom group published a whole series of pamphlets which were designed to prove that the National Socialist regime did not mark a breach with the period of the Weimar Republic but was its logical result and continuation. (B. Menne, German Industry on the Warpath; Carl Herz, The Straight Line; Curt Geyer, Hitler's New, The Kaiser's Old Order; F. K. Bieligk, Statistical Truth; B. Menne, The Case of Dr. Bruening.)

Although some of these accusations come with bad grace from two former Social Democrats who shared the responsibility for determining the policy of the party before 1933 and one of them at least, Walter Loeb, has no great record as a fighter against National Socialism, many of their charges hit the mark with a deadly accuracy. When a prominent Social Democrat like Friedrich Stampfer, who as editor of the Vorwaers

was supported by the German generals at the end of the last war, can stubbornly insist in his book the Fourteen Years that from 4 August 1914 down until 30 January 1933 the Social Democratic Party committed not a single major political error, the charge of untruthfulness cannot easily be avoided. The same charge also applies to Albert Grzesinski's book on the period of the Weimar Republic.

The secession and propaganda of the Fight For Freedom group has stirred up more animosity and personal resentments in the German emigration of Sweden, London and New York than any other single event of the past year, for their attack was directed not only against Social Democrats but also against the dissident Socialist groups, particularly Neu Beginnen. To the German Social Democrats this "inverted chauvinism" with its cry "Down with Ourselves," as they called it, was incomprehensible. They wrote reply after reply to the slightly exaggerated Vansittartism of the Geyer-Loeb group, contending that if every German is a National Socialist, if indeed it could be proved that there is no "other Germany," all hope of a democracy in a future Germany was useless. Above all they could not forgive Camille Huysmans, the chairman of the Second Socialist and Labor International, for openly proclaiming his support of the German Fight For Freedom group.

It was natural that Walter Loeb should attempt to establish an American branch of his Fight For Freedom group. He sought the support of William Agar of Freedom House, and subsequently of Robert Watt, the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor. Both, however, declined. His only supporters in the German emigration of the United States are Emil Ludwig, Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the well known German pacifist, and T. H. Tetens. Emil Ludwig expounded his Vansittartist views in a hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on 26 March 1943. Between Emil Ludwig and the Fight For Freedom group in Great Britain, however, there is a difference. While anti-Prussianism is a defunct issue to the Geyer-Loeb group, it is the core of Ludwig's argument. Dr. F. W. Foerster and T. H. Tetens are also anti-Prussians, but their attack, Would You Sign This Letter?, published jointly by them in March 1943, is not directed against the German political emigration but against native German Americans and does not concern us here.

The controversy that has arisen over the German Fight For Freedom Group in London, has administered a shock to the entire German political emigration. This effect was intensified when the British Labor Party took up the debate on postwar Germany in its forty-second annual conference in June 1943. The resolution that was finally adopted by a substantial majority followed the Vansittartist line of the German Fight For Freedom group, that there is no "other Germany" except in the sense of an insignificant and powerless minority, and that a drastic treatment, perhaps even the dismemberment of Germany, was necessary. The question as to whether this resolution was adopted under the influence of the German Fight for Freedom group or of the supporters of Lord Vansittart in the British Labor Party is immaterial in this connection. What is important is the fact that the resolution was a rebuke to the German Social Democratic Party in Britain, which has been proclaiming the opposite doctrine of the "other Germany." All the implications of this resolution for German Social

Democrats are not yet apparent. What is apparent is an accentuation of the strained relations between the British Labor Party and the German Social Democrats, plainly noticeable already before. When a prominent British Socialist in 1943 tells them, "We have nothing in common," much has changed since 1940 when they hopefully set up their headquarters in London.

It should be added, however, that inside the British Labor Party machinery, most probably inside the Executive, discussions have begun on the possibility of altering the resolution of June 1943, in next year's Party Conference. It should also be pointed out that the British Trade Union Congress in its September (1943) meeting refused to adopt a resolution similar to that of the Labor Party.

It is reasonably certain, however, that the German Socialists will not act precipitously. It is not likely that a mere resolution of the British Labor Party will cause the German Socialists to swing to Russia and seek an understanding with the German Communist Party and its leader, Wilhelm Pieck, in Moscow. Nor will the publication of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943 produce so radical a change.

VI. THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS IN SWEDEN

The principal German emigre party groups in Sweden are The Social Democrats under the leadership of Kurt Heinig, the SAP, led by August Enderle, and The German Communist Party. ISK and Neu Beginnen have only two or three original members respectively in Sweden, and they play no important role. In Sweden also some of the old quarrels between these groups continue. But for the past year all these groups cooperate in The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Sozialdemokratischen und Gewerkschaftlichen Emigration. This comprehensive organization was created to facilitate cooperative planning for post-war Germany among all The German Socialist emigres in Sweden, even the German Communists. Nowhere outside of Sweden have German Communists been welcomed in any organization of German Socialist emigres. This was possible largely because in Sweden it is not the political parties but German trade unionists that play the dominant role. It has also been attributed to another cause. There are good reasons for believing that the contacts between German Socialists in Sweden with opposition groups in Germany, though exceedingly precarious, have not been entirely cut off. There is a widespread impression among German emigres in Sweden that the distinction between old party lines have become unimportant in the underground movements inside Germany.

The outstanding figure in the German emigration in Sweden is Fritz Tarnow, a leading German trade unionist and a prominent member of the old Social Democratic Party. It is now almost forgotten that in 1932 he negotiated with General von Schleicher over a plan to establish a German corporative State, dominated by the army and the trade unions. Tarnow's present Arbeitsgemeinschaft 200 German trade unionists includes besides Social Democrats and Communists also the SAP. The fact that the vast majority of German refugees in Sweden are former trade union officials may well have facilitated this comprehensive organization. Besides the Social Democrats, the most active members of this organization are the 50 members of SAP, led by the able August Enderle. It now also publishes a semi-monthly journal. This organization enjoys the moral and financial support of the Swedish trade unions and of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. So close are Tarnow's relations with the Swedes, that he is said to do nothing without their knowledge and consent. It has even been said that his various plans for post-war Germany have the approval of the Swedish Government, a report which it has been impossible to verify.

Like his friend, Dr. Heinrich Bruening to whom he sends his plans for post-war Germany, Fritz Tarnow is a nationalist who is willing to go to extreme lengths to prevent the disruption of the territorial unity of Germany. Reports of drastic peace terms have disturbed him. When Paul Einzig published his article in the Economic Journal a year ago to the effect that to disarm Germany it was not enough to dismantle the armament industry but that the German machine tool industry had to be abolished and that 51 percent of the proprietory rights in German heavy industries should be transferred to the Allies, Tarnow was horrified. If this proposal becomes the basis of the peace, he wrote to Ollenhauer in London, "then I myself could offer no better advice to German workers than to capitulate to Russian Bolshevism and place themselves under the protecting wing of the Soviet Union."

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This appears to be more than a momentary emotional response. When a member of the German Labor Delegation was asked whether that would be his response to Einzig's peace terms he made a similar reply.

Being himself a trade unionist and working together with former trade union officials, Tarnow's planning for post-war Germany is dominated by trade union interests. Ideology and principles are necessary as a driving force, he states, but of what use are they unless you have a machine? Tarnow, therefore, is chiefly concerned with this machine, and he shares with other older Social Democrats an exaggerated opinion of the importance of organization as such, irrespective of its larger purpose. He is above all interested in divorcing completely the trade unions from political parties in the new Germany. Most of his plans for post-war Germany revolve around the problem of transforming the Nazi Arbeitsfront into trade unions. His prime concerns are the maintenance of the present unity of the Arbeitsfront and the transfer of its vast property to his projected single national trade union, organized on the basis of one trade union for each industry. This unified national trade union organization, he argues, is designed to prevent a mad scramble of the new political parties for the control of the German trade unions.

Tarnow's plan for the transformation of the Nazi Labor Front has passed through a series of changes. His original plan which was decidedly authoritarian has provoked a volume of criticism from all quarters. In his first version he proposed the retention of the whole basic structure of the present Nazi Labor Front, merely demanding the dismissal of all Nazi officials. It may be a matter of interest to note that it was in this version that he sent the plan to Dr. Heinrich Bruening. It was especially the SAP, as represented by August Enderle and Martin Krebs, which denounced the authoritarian character of this plan. They demanded an immediate, not an eventual, democratization. In its final version all compulsory features have been eliminated from the plan and the proposal for unity has been placed on a voluntary basis.

VII. THE GERMAN LABOR DELEGATION

The situation of the German Socialists in the United States concerns us here only insofar as it reflects or influences developments among German emigre Socialists elsewhere. This situation is in many ways unique, because German Socialists in the United States, though more numerous than in other countries, are only partially organized, owing largely to the confusion among German emigres here between emigration and immigration. Many of the ablest former German Socialists such as the members of the New School of Social Research and the Institute of Social Research shun emigre politics of any kind, while others, like Gerhart Seger and Rudolf Katz, though American citizens, devote much of their time to emigre political activities. There are no organizations in the United States comparable to the London "Union" or Tarnow's Arbeitsgemeinschaft in Sweden. The Association of Free Germans, presided over by Albert Grzesinski and dominated by Social Democrats, is now practically dormant. Neither the ISK nor the SAP possess independent organizations of their own in the United States; the twenty members of the latter group, with Jakob Walcher at their head, are giving their support to the Neu Beginnen group. The German American Emergency Conference, though directed by such emigres as Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, a former Prussien Minister of Justice, and Felix Boehnheim, a fellow traveller, is composed chiefly of American citizens and does not concern us here. There are therefore only two groups that fall within the definition of a political organization of German Socialist refugees: the German Labor Delegation and the Neu Beginnen group.

The German Labor Delegation, composed of ten prominent former Social Democratic officeholders, was organized in 1938 to represent the Social Democratic Party in the United States. It was recognized by the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. and soon acquired a formidable position by obtaining control of the editorial policy of the Neue Volkszeitung, an old German American Socialist weekly, through Gerhart Seger and Rudolf Katz, its editors, who are also members of the German Labor Delegation. Even today no political article is published in the Neue Volkszeitung without the approval of Max Brauer, the present chairman of the Delegation. The Delegation also acts more or less in the capacity of a steering committee for the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation which, besides the main body of American citizens, includes about thirty German Social Democratic refugees.

Until January 1943 the German Labor Delegation was presided over by Albert Grzesinski, the former Prussian Minister of the Interior and Police President of Berlin, a more extreme type of the refugee genus, who is conscious of, and sensitive about, his former political importance. Since January 1943, the German Labor Delegation has two chairmen, Max Brauer, the former mayor of Altona, now counsel for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, a leading former German trade unionist and head of the German white collar workers union, and the only former Independent Socialist (USPD) in the Delegation. The other members are: Friedrich Stampfer, the old editor of the Vorwärts, who declared that he would refuse to print news about the rearmament of Germany when he sought to set up a labor news agency in London in 1936 on the ground that it

would be treason to Germany; Erich Rinner, the editor of the former Social Democratic Grüne Hefte, and together with Stampfer the only member of the original Party Executive Committee of 1933 in the German Labor Delegation; Dr. Hans Staudinger, former Ministerial Counsellor of the Prussian Ministry of Commerce, now Dean of the New School for Social Research; Dr. Alfred Braunthal and Hedwig Wachenheim; Gerhart Seger, the editor in chief of the Neue Volkszeitung; Dr. Rudolf Katz, a former attorney and city alderman, a Social Democratic red-baiter and together with Grzesinski one of the most determined enemies of Paul Hagen. Nowhere is there an organization of more prominent Social Democrats than the German Labor Delegation. Such men as Grzesinski, Stampfer and Brauer are old members of the party and known throughout Europe. Siegfried Aufhaeuser is, perhaps, together with Tarnow the foremost German trade union leader in the entire German emigration. Gerhart Seger is known as an anti-Fascist lecturer among the Rotary Clubs of America in almost every state of the Union. Dr. Erich Rinner, who is inactive since his employment on the staff of OWI, is one of the more progressive members of the original Party Executive, and Dr. Hans Staudinger is widely known as one of the scholarly economists of the Social Democratic Party. His name also does not appear on the list of members because of his position on the staff of the New School of Social Research. He does not attend all the meetings of the group. On the other hand, he does not feel that he can afford to separate from the group.

No other group of emigre Social Democrats has at its disposal a German language newspaper such as the Neue Volkszeitung which, so Seger assures us, has a circulation between 20,000 and 25,000. It is scarcely correct to describe all the members of the German Labor Delegation as representing the extreme right wing of the old Social Democratic Party. Such a description scarcely applies to Aufhaeuser, Dr. Staudinger, and Dr. Rinner. The last two, however, rarely attend the meetings of the group. What is common to them all, however, is a very genuine fear of the penetration of Communists or secret Communists into the organization of the Social Democratic Party. Scarcely less great is their fear of former Communists who, while they have broken with the German Communist Party, still adhere to the principle of party dictatorship and resort to the tactics of forming secret cliques within the Social Democratic Party. In view of their unhappy experience with such cliques during the period of the early underground struggle against the Hitler regime, this fear is intelligible. This fear goes far toward explaining their resolute opposition to Paul Hagen and the Neu Beginnen group which constituted such a clique in the early days of the underground movement.

When the German Labor Delegation was organized in 1938 it was the only organized group of German political refugees in the United States. The vast majority of the active German Social Democratic political refugees now living in the United States, however, arrived in 1940 after the fall of France when the German underground organizations collapsed. If the claim of the German Labor Delegation to represent the Social Democratic Party in the United States was legitimate and plausible enough in 1938, in 1942 when literally hundreds of Social Democrats were in the country, this claim was no

longer recognized by all Social Democrats. To escape from this somewhat ridiculous situation, certain members of this body proposed opening the ranks of the Delegation to newcomers. However, a group in the Delegation, composed of Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger and Katz, refused to accept this proposal partly because of their Neue Volkszeitung connections, partly because the surrender of an entrenched position involved loss of influence and leadership to others whose loyalty to the old Social Democratic leadership they had good reasons to suspect. It was agreed to advise the other refugee Social Democrats in the United States to join the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation. Only a few responded to this invitation, the great majority remaining unattached. When the pressure for the extension of the German Labor Delegation once more became acute in the autumn of 1941, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger and Katz with the support of others not members of the Delegation, proposed the creation of an entirely new organization of German political refugees, the Association of Free Germans, which was to include all the parties which had supported the Weimar Republic. Largely because this same group of the German Labor Delegation, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger, and Katz, promptly moved in to control this new organization, the Association of Free Germans never really came to life. They did, however, succeed in persuading other Social Democrats, who were not members of the German Labor Delegation, to become members of this new organization. Approximately twenty of the twenty eight members of the Association of Free Germans, are Social Democrats. Four of the seven members of the Board of Directors of this organization are also members of the German Labor Delegation. Apart from issuing its declaration of October 1942, the Association of Free Germans has been inactive. Some of its committees have never met.

In the meantime two original members of the German Labor Delegation, Wilhelm Sollmann, former Minister of the Interior of the Reich and perhaps the ablest Social Democrat in the United States, and Professor Alfred Kaehler had resigned. When, finally, three members of the original Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, George Dietrich, Paul Hertz, and Marie Juchacs arrived in the United States, and either refused or were denied membership in the German Labor Delegation, the fact the members of this body represented only themselves and their supporters in the Association of Free Germans, the Neue Volkszeitung corporation, and a small group in the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation but scarcely the Social Democratic Party became fully apparent.

In the meantime Paul Hagen (Karl Frank) and the Socialists of the Neu Beginnen group were shrewd enough to exploit this neglect of the great body of Social Democratic political refugees on the part of the German Labor Delegation. Anxious to build up his following, Hagen collected funds to bring old members of the Neu Beginnen group to the United States and found employment for them after their arrival. Thanks to his political and organizing ability, his undeniable personal charm and apparent sincerity, his great energy and persistence, he succeeded in enlarging the original nucleus of the Neu Beginnen group (about 20) which consisted largely of the members of his former underground organization, by winning over a considerable number of older Social Democrats

such as Dr. Hans Hirschfeld and Haass as open supporters or sympathizers. Being something of a political opportunist, he did not inquire too closely into the views of his supporters. His progress was all the greater because he shrewdly did not insist on registered membership. The result was that the group which gathered around him was rather heterogeneous. It has also exposed him to the charge of political opportunism. He had already obtained the active support of Jakob Walcher and the twenty odd former members of the left wing SAP living in the United States. He achieved his greatest success, however, when he won the active support of three of the five members of the original Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party living in the United States, Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz and Marie Juchacs. When more than 150 political refugees, including Social Democrats, members of the SAP and ISK, regularly attended the evening sessions of the German Language Group of the American Friends of German Freedom, Paul Hagen, and Neu Beginnen had become a formidable power in the German political emigration of the United States. Not all those who attended his meetings became his open supporters. But in an informal way he had achieved a unity among German emigre Socialists comparable to that of the London "Union."

With such a following behind him Paul Hagen openly challenged the authority of the German Labor Delegation alone to represent German Social Democrats in the United States. Alarmed on their part by this rapid growth of Hagen's influence, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger, and Katz began to attack the Neu Beginnen movement in all its aspects. This quarrel must be reserved for later discussion. Suffice it to say here that, if Paul Hagen is today, next to ex-chancellor Bruening, the most publicized figure in the German emigration in the United States this is in large measure due to the publicity which the Neue Volkszeitung has given him.

No one was more regretfully conscious of the neglect of the large body of former Social Democrats in the United States by the German Labor Delegation than Max Brauer and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, the two chairmen of that body. In the spring of 1943 they sought a belated remedy for the situation by calling a conference or Landeskonferenz of all those political exiles in the United States who belonged to the Social Democratic Party on 30 January 1933. Thus stated, the project for the conference already fell short of the program of the London "Union," for this meant the exclusion of SAP and ISK. But even to call upon all former Social Democrats to attend the conference appeared to invite disaster in view of the strength of Neu Beginnen. The members of the Delegation, therefore, struck upon the expedient of setting up a special invitation committee to examine credentials. This committee, composed of two members from the German Labor Delegation, two members from the Neue Volkszeitung corporation, and two from the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation and two American citizens, could be safely relied upon to exclude any Social Democrat not approved by the German Labor Delegation.

If a conference, called under such auspices, could be expected to be reasonably safe, the attempt to pack the meeting had become so obvious, that the three members of the Executive Committee of the Party, Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz,

and Marie Juchacs, supported by seventy-two other members of the Social Democratic Party, addressed a formal letter of protest to the German Labor Delegation, announcing their refusal to attend such a conference. The letter dated 30 June 1943 itself is worth quoting:

"We, the undersigned (Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz, Marie Juchacs), members of the Parteivorstand elected in Germany in 1933, the only legal Party body of the old Social Democratic movement in Germany, refuse for ourselves and in the name of seventy-two other members of the SPD to participate in the conference to be held on 3 July 1943. It is manifest from the form and content of the invitation that those calling the conference do not intend to hold a real Landeskonferenz in which all former members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, now living in the United States, have a right to participate, but to call a meeting of well-disposed guests. Therefore, we asked those calling the conference to summon a genuinely democratic meeting instead. We were guided by the hope that such a conference might be the first step towards a "Union" such as exists in London and Stockholm. Both in London and Stockholm all Social Democratic groups are united and work together on problems which must be solved after the downfall of Hitler. Those summoning the July conference have declined to take any step leading toward joint action and any cooperation with the groups and persons (meaning, Paul Hagen and Neu Beginnen) who did have and shall have real communication with the underground in Germany."

In this document the members of the German Labor Delegation were charged with undemocratic conduct by a majority of the members of the Social Democratic Party Executive in the United States. While he himself remained discreetly in the background, Paul Hagen allowed the members of the Party Executive to fight his battle for him. That this shrewd political tactician was, nonetheless, the prime mover of this stinging protest, there can be no doubt. Once Paul Hertz, a loyal supporter of Neu Beginnen and a pliable tool in the hands of Paul Hagen, had taken the lead, Georg Dietrich and Marie Juchacs, who had troubles of their own with the German Labor Delegation, needed little persuasion. Nor was it difficult to round up seventy-two former Social Democrats among the supporters of the Neu Beginnen.

The "Landeskonferenz" duly met on 3 July 1943, and was a publicity success, for it was not intended to be more than that. Speeches were delivered and resolutions passed -- but the situation was left as it was before. Whether the conference succeeded in "creating an impression in Washington" -- so Dr. H. Staudinger ironically described its principal purpose -- must still remain a matter of doubt.

From what has already been said the difference between the German Social Democrats in London and the members of the German Labor Delegation in New York must be apparent. The Delegation recognizes the authority of the Parteivorstand in London and contributes, through the agency of the Jewish Labor Committee, to its financial support. For the rest, those members of the German Labor Delegation, who belong to the extreme right wing of the Social Democratic Old Guard, appear to be at loggerheads with the London group on almost every major issue. In London Vogel and Ollenhauer have been

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cooperating effectively with left wing Socialists as represented by SAP and Neu Beginnen. There the old quarrels of the period of their underground struggle have been largely forgotten. In New York the German Labor Delegation has not only refused to collaborate with the SAP but has widened the gap which previously existed between it and the Neu Beginnen group. Hans Vogel and the members of the London Sopade admit that the old Social Democratic Party in Germany is irretrievably gone and contend that the most urgent task of the German Socialist emigration is to prepare the foundations for a new united German labor party which will embrace all former Socialist groups, including former Communists. Friedrich Stampfer and his colleagues in New York, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the preservation of the old Social Democratic Party as it existed in 1932, without any modification of its program or change in its leadership. Stampfer and Grzesinski have denounced Vogel and the London Sopade for having abandoned the great Social Democratic tradition by accepting the program of the London Union. They requested their London colleagues to break off their relations with the SAP and Neu Beginnen groups. Impressed by the ubiquitous influence of Neu Beginnen in the United States, they now accuse their London colleagues of having succumbed to its influence also. With the exception of Aufhäuser and Staudinger, the members of the Delegation are alarmed by the recent leftist tendencies of their official London leaders.

It may very well be that Brauer and Aufhaeuser, the two new chairmen, may inject new life into the work of the German Labor Delegation which hitherto has wasted its energies in defending itself and attacking others. But the very existence of two coordinate chairmen is indicative of a certain lack of unity between the two factions which has paralyzed the German Labor Delegation for the past two years. While numerous plans and studies on post-war Germany have been produced in London and Sweden, not a single important study or document has yet emerged from the German Labor Delegation.

VIII. NEU BEGINNEN

At first glance the feud between the German Labor Delegation and Neu Beginnen is a purely local quarrel over the controversial personality of Paul Hagen (Dr. Karl Frank) that has no counterpart in London or Sweden. In reality it is the re-enactment on American soil of the old quarrel between the Sopade and its dissident Socialist groups in the early German underground movement of which Otto Bauer, the well known Austrian Socialist, has given the only authentic and neutral description in his Die Illegale Partei, published secretly in Paris in 1939, shortly after the author's death. The wiser and more thoughtful members of the German Labor Delegation, notably Max Brauer, are acutely aware of this and have discountenanced Seger's and Katz's attacks on Paul Hagen's character, attacks denouncing him as dishonest (in the matter of underground reports), as a thief (in the administration of underground funds), or as a criminal (referring to the short prison sentence pronounced against Hagen in his Communist days in the middle twenties when he forcibly detained the Social Democrat Schwarz to allow a Communist to speak over the radio in his stead). On Max Brauer's insistence these personal attacks have now been discontinued, at least publicly, as futile and undignified. The struggle continues as one over principles and general political outlook.

In the following discussion it is well to keep in mind that the group which today gathers around the person of Paul Hagen can scarcely any longer be identified with the original Neu Beginnen group. Between 1935 and 1940 this group was essentially an underground organization. In 1943 the overwhelming majority of Hagen's supporters are Social Democrats who never had any connections with Neu Beginnen. While there are no more than twenty people from the Neu Beginnen group now in New York.

No German underground movement between 1933 and 1939 was really effective. But if we are to accept Otto Bauer's testimony, Neu Beginnen, even though small and little known, possessed one of the most efficient underground organizations in Germany before 1939. He is even inclined to regard it as superior to that of the Sopade just as in many ways the Neu Beginnen Die Nachrichten were superior to the Grune Hefte.

Like the Italian Giustizia e Liberta and the Austrian Revolutionary Socialists with whom it was closely allied, Neu Beginnen arose as a dissident group within the Social Democratic Party and did not itself, like the SAP, aspire to be a party. Its early members were shaken by the completeness of the defeat of the Socialist movement and the equally thorough triumph of Fascism. This utter collapse of the Socialist parties was the point of departure of their criticism. They said, we are not merely a continuation of the old Social Democratic Party but represent something new. The old mass party has been utterly defeated and disrupted and its official leaders have been discredited along with their reformism and opportunism both at home and abroad. There must be a new beginning, a Neu Beginnen, with new ideas and principles, a new spirit, new tactics, and above all new leaders. There must be a renovation along more radical Marxist lines and an adaptation of party organization

to the necessities of an underground struggle. The new leaders who emerge from the brutally selective process of the underground struggle against Hitler, will be the new leaders of the coming German labor party. Mass underground movements are a failure under Fascism. The new underground party must be a cadre party, composed of small units of elite leaders, highly disciplined and trained in Marxism and in revolutionary technique. Professors of revolution, their opponents derisively called them.

Underground operations must of necessity be conducted by younger men, and it is the height of injustice, when Paul Hagen accuses older well known men such as Otto Wels, Max Brauer, or Friedrich Stampfer of never having risked their lives in underground activities. On the other hand it is equally unjust when these older Social Democrats of the German Labor Delegation, who did not participate in the underground movement, and have little knowledge of it, denounce Neu Beginnen as a band of conspirators. Indeed, to train themselves in the art of anti-Nazi conspiracy was the central purpose of the schools which Neu Beginnen established everywhere on the frontiers of Germany. Lenin's phrase of "democratic centralism" describes most aptly their party organization; their leaders were anonymous and known only to a few. Their rigid code of personal discipline and secrecy was forced upon them by the nature of their work. No doubt, they were careless at times. But that was true of the Sopade also. On two occasions agents of the Gestapo, one named Schwab and another named Ochmann, wormed their way into the office of the Sopade in Prague. The latter, we are told, delivered into the hands of the Gestapo hundreds of photostatic copies of biographies and reports which newly arrived refugees had submitted to the Social Democratic Relief Center in Prague.

Far from regarding them as reckless, Otto Bauer admired the minute prescriptions by which the members of Neu Beginnen subjected their private lives to the needs of anti-Nazi conspiracy. They issued instructions prohibiting the use of alcoholic beverages, on conducting their private correspondence, on the choice and change of places of residence, on the preservation of subversive literature, and particularly on secrecy about the structure and work of the organization. No member knew more about the network and activities of the organization than was necessary for the performance of his partial task. They assumed false names, which many of them still retain. They developed a special party language which no one else could understand. Those who violated the discipline of conspiratorial conduct were quickly eliminated. They were trained much in the manner of a soldier in a modern army. Some of their units were discovered, some of their members are still serving sentences in Nazi prison camps. Dr. Eliasberg, now employed in OWI, mentions a single case of a Nazi spy penetrating their network, and contends that he did not get near the center. Even today, two years after the disruption of their underground organization, no Neu Beginnen member communicates with another member in a different country through the mails.

In the past ten years Neu Beginnen passed through three successive evolutionary stages: the Miles Group, the organization of Neu Beginnen in 1935, and finally its

activities since the collapse of the underground. Today the members of Neu Beginnen protest against being identified with the Miles Group. It is nonetheless true, that Neu Beginnen emerged from this group. Walter Loewenheim (alias Miles) organized this discussion group in 1931 in Germany as the disaster was approaching. The Miles Group was composed largely of members of the former Social Democratic youth organizations, younger members of the Social Democratic Party, young trade unionists, and some members of SAP. There were three former Communists in the group: Walter Loewenheim, Richard Loewenthal (alias Paul Sering now in London) and Paul Hagen (Dr. Karl Frank). Paul Hagen had left the Communist Party in 1929, and he joined this group before he was accepted as a member of the Social Democratic Party in the autumn of 1932 (there are so many witnesses to Hagen's membership in the Social Democratic Party in the United States that the fact no longer appears open to serious doubt.). The purpose of the group was to prepare a new theoretical program which was to be as critical of the Party Executive Committee as it was of the Comintern. Beyond that, the intention of the group seems to have been the organization of a left wing within the Social Democratic Party to force a more radical Marxist policy upon its leaders. The discussions of the group were secret, which may account for some of the resentments which later developed. The group had not yet completed its work when Hitler came to power, but there were already a sufficient number of units in the larger cities and industrial districts of Germany to enable it to go underground.

In the meantime Miles-Loewenheim had written a pamphlet, entitled Neu Beginnen, which was published in Carlsbad in 1934 with funds granted by the official Sopade. The fact that the Sopade released the funds for the publication of this able but radical pamphlet is indicative of the radicalism of defeat which was quite common even among older Social Democrats in the days immediately after the collapse of the Weimar Republic. According to Paul Hagen, this pamphlet was the expression of Miles-Loewenheim's personal thought and was written without previous consultation with others.

The argument of the Miles Neu Beginnen pamphlet runs briefly as follows. Mass proletarian labor parties, because they are controlled by trade union pressure groups, have not and cannot advance beyond democratic and trade unionist objectives. For this reason the central European labor parties of the post-war period were not revolutionary parties. These parties never really challenged the political and economic power of those classes which later exploited the crisis during the period of depression to facilitate the transfer of governmental authority to Fascism. But this did not happen in Russia where no mass labor parties existed before the Soviet Revolution. Quite to the contrary, there were only small units of highly trained Marxists and Socialists who were preparing for a revolutionary struggle against Czarism. These small units, working together, succeeded in the course of the revolution in acquiring an effective leadership over the revolutionary masses. Taking advantage of a spontaneous revolution, they set the goal for this revolution which no longer aimed at merely democratic and trade unionist objectives. They destroyed capitalism, conquered political power, and established a Socialist society. Therefore, so argues Miles, no spontaneous uprising of the

masses can ever lead to a Socialist revolution. This can be done only by the combination of these highly trained local units into a rigidly centralized and disciplined revolutionary party. While Miles was as critical of the Comintern as were the other Social Democrats, he nonetheless demanded a single party dictatorship. The most important function of an underground movement in Nazi Germany, he argued, was to train such cadres which, once they were combined into a rigidly centralized party, could take up the struggle with Nazi dictatorship.

We are not concerned here with the validity of the argument contained in the Miles pamphlet. However, it cannot be surprising, if the views expressed in this pamphlet were subsequently attributed to the Neu Beginnen group. In the United States these views have been dogging the footsteps of the members of Neu Beginnen ever since their arrival. So long as there was no official repudiation one can scarcely blame the Labor Delegation for being suspicious. Max Brauer of the Labor Delegation still charges them with retaining the Miles program, notwithstanding the fact that the Neu Beginnen pamphlet, Der Kommende Weltkrieg, written by Loewenthal-Sering together with some Austrian Revolutionary Socialists, definitely repudiated the Miles-Loewenheim doctrine of a single-party dictatorship in 1939. In 1940 Erwin Schoettle, the head of the London Auslandsburo of Neu Beginnen, clearly repudiated the same doctrine in his Neu Beginnen, Wie Es Wurde, published in London. Hagen himself repudiated it. The latter states that Miles-Loewenheim had lost influence in this discussion group already in 1934. In June 1935, a secret conference of all the various units of the Miles Group was held in Berlin. On this occasion a majority voted in favor of the democratic process and against the single-party dictatorship views of Miles, who then retired from the group.

This 1935 conference also marks the official organization of the Neu Beginnen group as an independent underground organization. It was decided to establish an Auslandsburo in Prague but within the framework of the Social Democratic Party in exile. The conference despatched a delegate, named Falk, to Brussels in July 1935 to notify the Bureau of the Labor and Socialist International of this decision. At the same time Falk carried with him a statement explaining the principles of the Neu Beginnen group.

Since Neu Beginnen was one of the few organizations which opposed the emigration en masse of its members, there were two governing bodies, the Central Committee in Berlin and the Auslandsburo in Prague. It is not probable that the former survived 1941, but the latter subsequently moved to Paris, where it had the support of Leon Blum, and in 1940 to London, where it still remains.

In view of the disastrous experience of the Sopade with its mass underground movement, Neu Beginnen was and remained an organization of cadres, not all of which were in continuous contact with one another or with the Auslandsburo. Besides the original nucleus of the Miles Group, the composition of which has already been discussed, the following units were either part of or cooperated with the Neu Beginnen underground organization: the remnants of the former Religious Socialists, led by Dr. Paul Tillich, with approximately twenty centers in

Germany; the Berlin Socialist Youth organization and through its last secretary, Erich Schmidt, now in Boston, Socialist Youth units in all parts of Germany; a surviving group of younger trade unionists of whom Bernard Taurer, now employed in OWI, was the most conspicuous representative; surviving elements of the former Socialist Student organization; several local groups of the Social Democratic Party; and the so-called Ten Point Group, consisting of older functionaries of the Social Democratic Party with affiliations all over Germany. The Central Committee in Berlin was also connected with several other groups of trade unionists, railway men, construction workers, transport workers, and, especially, through the SAP, with metal workers.

A mere glance at this list is sufficient to explain the accusation of the Sopade that Neu Beginnen was poaching on its own ground. It will also explain the rooted conviction of Neu Beginnen members to the effect that the old Social Democratic Party in Germany had gone to pieces. It is not at all improbable that they helped along this process of disintegration. Presently, the Sopade made the charge that Neu Beginnen was resorting to the Communist tactics of forming secret cells of its own supporters within the Social Democratic Party. Max Brauer still repeats this accusation. The members of Neu Beginnen most immediately affected by this charge, Erwin Schoettle, Knoerringen, Boegler, W. Klatt, Paul Anderson (all now in England) and Haass (now in the United States) offer the following reply to this charge. They were, like Dr. Hans Hirschfeld who has now joined Neu Beginnen in New York, frontier secretaries of the Sopade in the various countries on the frontiers of Germany. Once they convinced themselves that Neu Beginnen was doing superior underground work, they became members of this new organization. They did not, however, in each case announce this new affiliation to the Sopade, because they, so at least they say, did not consider this office in Prague sufficiently responsible in view of the previous penetration into it of two agents of the Gestapo. Because of the secrecy which still envelopes their past underground activities it is impossible to verify the truth of these statements today.

After a brief period of cooperation, during which Neu Beginnen shared in the funds of the Sopade, the two organizations were at loggerheads along the whole line. It was a contest between two political programs, a competition between an older and a younger generation of Social Democrats, a competition for members and units inside Germany and for supporters among political emigres, a contest between two theories of underground organization. It is, perhaps, natural that the resentments among the older members of the Sopade were more intense. On one occasion Otto Wels, the late chairman of the Executive Committee of the Sopade, is reported to have denounced the entire underground organization of Germany as being Communistic. This did not, however, prevent Friedrich Stampfer from telling reporters in New York that they had a correspondent in every German factory. Certain less careful members of the German Labor Delegation, but no longer a majority, still apply the designation of crypto-Communists to the Neu Beginnen group. A careful examination of their membership lists, however, indicates that less than 5 percent of Neu Beginnen is composed of former Communists. Nor is it accurate when applied to their

general political outlook. In Great Britain Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, B. F. Heine and Wilhelm Sander have long since ceased to utter similar charges even in the case of Loewenthal-Sering who might be suspected of Communist leanings. With the exception of four members of the German Labor Delegation, no one in the entire German emigration of New York whose opinion is worth listening to, today suspects Paul Hagen of being anything but a left wing Social Democrat.

Cut off from the official party funds of the Sopade, Neu Beginnen developed its own finances. In this it was remarkably successful, owing chiefly to the tireless energy and shrewd tactics of Paul Hagen. It was not long before a sharp antagonism between the Sopade and Neu Beginnen developed in this matter also. Between 1935 and 1940 the group collected, in addition to membership dues, the following sums: 40,000 German marks from the Sopade before it discontinued its financial support; 5,000 Swiss francs from the Swiss trade unions and the Swiss Social Democratic Party; 90,000 French francs from Leon Blum; 50,000 Czech crowns chiefly from the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party; £500 from England, largely a personal gift from Sir Stafford Cripps; and between $90,000 and $100,000 from the United States.

These figures are merely approximations. The members of the German Labor Delegation, notably Gerhart Seger, have charged Hagen with collecting these sums under false pretenses, and contend that he presented himself frequently as the "leader" of the "German underground movement." Hagen, on the other hand contends that he never collected money except for the Neu Beginnen underground group. In the upshot, it appears that the severest criticism that can be directed against Paul Hagen is that he did yield to the temptation of allowing himself to be presented as the leader of the German underground. Whether he was in each case personally responsible for this kind of publicity or whether it must not rather be laid to the door of Reinhold Niebuhr, his principal American sponsor since the death of Charney Vladeck, is another matter.

Paul Hagen was shrewd enough to place the administration of these mounting sums into the hands of a committee composed of Paul Hertz (as chairman), Boegler and himself. Paul Hertz assumed his new duties as the treasurer of Neu Beginnen only after full discussion with the Secretariat of the Labor and Socialist International. This body, no more favorably disposed to the Sopade in 1935 than it is in 1943, encouraged Hertz to accept. Hertz, it will be recalled, was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Sopade. He had informed the members of the Committee of his close affiliations with the Neu Beginnen group, and until 1938 no one seems to have voiced any objections. So far as can be ascertained it does not appear probable that Hertz informed the Sopade of his functions as treasurer of Neu Beginnen. His conduct was described as unethical. At all events, when the Sopade moved to Paris in 1938 Otto Wels insisted on Hertz's withdrawal from the Committee. Hertz assures us that it was his opposition to Sopade financing that drove him into cooperation with Neu Beginnen. He objected to the expensive apparatus of the Sopade in Prague and still contends that Neu Beginnen spent larger sums for underground work in Germany. Neu Beginnen salaries, he states, were smaller by a third, and pure relief funds were held to a minimum. It also appears that Neu Beginnen granted funds of its own to Social Democratic groups in and outside of Germany.

By 1939 the Neu Beginnen Auslandsburo in Paris had contacts through its "frontier secretaries" with nine groups in Bavaria, five groups in Silesia, three groups in Wuerttemberg, two groups in the Palatinate, two units in Saxony besides its connections with the Central Committee in Berlin, which in turn had connections with the same and other units. The foreign headquarters of the underground organizations of the German miners and of the Rhenish textile workers were also connected with the Auslandsburo of Neu Beginnen. Up to 1939 it regularly despatched couriers to Germany to visit the center in Berlin and sometimes local units. These couriers were either Swiss, Norwegians, British, French, American, or Czech citizens, including Germans. It also arranged for regular visits from Germany to the Auslandsburo or to its frontier schools in France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia.

Anticipating the outbreak of the war, Neu Beginnen set up outposts for war-time contact in Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and Belgium. But contacts across the frontiers broke down completely with the outbreak of the war in 1939. Only a few direct messages from Berlin and Munich reached the outside world in 1940 and 1941. Nothing is known today of the survival of the various units in Germany. Erwin Schoettle was expelled from Switzerland, as were two other members of the Neu Beginnen underground group. The bureau in Oslo was liquidated during the German invasion, and Taurer, who had escaped to Stockholm, was brought to the United States, because it was feared that Sweden, too, could not remain neutral. The Neu Beginnen group in Holland was killed when the Gestapo followed in the wake of the German armies, while those in Belgium managed to escape to Great Britain.

There is no need to dwell here on the developments in the Neu Beginnen group since 1940, as these have been discussed in another connection. However, a few comments on Paul Hagen's position in the German Socialist emigration should be made. There is today no important ideological difference between Paul Hagen and the great body of Social Democratic exiles. In the past five years Hagen has definitely moved to the right, while the London and Stockholm groups have moved just as definitely to the left.

There are some Socialist emigres who have no connections with the German labor Delegation who regard him as a political opportunist. There is much in his conduct since his arrival in the United States that lends color to this view. His effort to adapt his propaganda to the conservative American political psychology is obvious. The difference between the argument of Der Kommende Weltkrieg of 1939, which he did not write but to which he subscribed, and his Um die Vollendung der Demokratischen Revolution, which he wrote in 1943, must be patent to every careful reader. His effort to accumulate more numbers of supporters is evidence of opportunism. In this matter the conduct of the German Labor Delegation has been more consistent.

When the London Union accepted the program for a new unified German labor party, thus abandoning the moorings of the old Social Democratic Party, it thereby placed its stamp of approval on the Neu Beginnen program. Thus, if Friedrich Stampfer complains that his London friends have fallen under Neu Beginnen influence, he is not so wide of the mark. This also applies to the German Social Democrats in Sweden who have

been cooperating cordially with the SAP group, the closest friends of Neu Beginnen. The composition of the Neu Beginnen group in New York is very much like that of the London Union. It is rather the German Labor Delegation which, because of its opposition to the unity program of the London Union, is in danger of becoming isolated in the German Socialist emigration today. Except for certain members of the German Labor Delegation, Paul Hagen is today much less critical of the Social Democratic leaders who have learned to adapt themselves than he was in 1935. He still hopes that Siegfried Aufhaeuser and Dr. Hans Staudinger, with whom he has neither a personal nor an ideological quarrel, will one day cooperate openly with him. Aufhaeuser has personal objections to Hagen. Dr. Staudinger, however, has informed his colleagues in the German Labor Delegation of his intention to remain on a cordial footing with Hagen. Like the Fight for Freedom group in London, Hagen today directs his principal criticism against the old Majority Socialists (Mehrheitssozialisten), the "Kaiser's Socialists", who represent the nationalist traditions of the last war, who prostrated themselves before the militarists under the Republic and brutally suppressed all left wing elements within the Social Democratic Party. He does not stand alone in the German emigration in regarding Grzesinski, Stampfer and Brauer as representing this tradition. But when Hagen today demands a more thoroughgoing democracy within the Party and its Parteivorstand, or a more generous tolerance of left wing factions within the Party, he is demanding nothing that is not already part of the program of the London Union. His lieutenants in London, Loewenthal-Sering and Schoettle, have been more successful than he has been in the United States.

Because of his former affiliation with the Communist Party Paul Hagen's struggle for leadership in the German Socialist emigration has been beset with enormous difficulties, difficulties which some regard as insuperable. He has far too many personal enemies to stand the slightest chance of ever becoming the unifier of the German political emigration in the United States. For this reason he never permits his identity as a leader of the German underground movement to become obscured. He is a product of this movement, and his activities during his secret journeys into Germany between 1933 and 1939, constitute, in his own mind, the only real basis for his claims to leadership.

In the mind of Paul Hagen the underground movement is inseparably connected with the prime function of a political emigration. The political and propaganda activities of an emigre organization have meaning only insofar as they depend upon an intimate connection with the opposition movement inside Germany. For a political emigration to pose as the "German Opposition" in England, Russia, and the United States without a real connection with the opposition movement inside Germany is to Paul Hagen political charlatanry. It is also political suicide, for it signalizes the deflection of a political emigration from its primary tasks. To be completely cut off from the political opposition in Germany is to be condemmed to political futility. This is the ghost which never ceases to haunt Hagen. It will also explain his frantic efforts to enlist the support of the British and American Governments for his underground movement. He still contends that before the German emigration, which he generally regards as intellectually sterile and politically unproductive, can do any intelligent planning for a post-war Germany, it must recover its contacts

with the German underground movement. To recover these lost contacts is and will remain Paul Hagen's strongest political aspiration.

Having thus far failed in this, the next most important function of a political emigration, according to Hagen, is the selection, education, and political training of the most useful elements in this emigration. This, in his mind, is the chief function of the regular fortnightly evening meetings of the German Language Group of the American Friends of German Freedom, sponsored by Reinhold Niebuhr. Between 130 and 200 German emigres of all political persuasions regularly attend these meetings. To these meetings he invites even his enemies of the Neue Volkszeitung and the German Labor Delegation. The function of these meetings is less to draft concrete plans such as Fritz Tarnow's plans for the transformation of the Nazi Labor Front into trade unions and for a provisional government than to provide basic political training and discussion both for himself and his audience.

In the late spring of 1943 he submitted to these mixed audiences the latest formulation of his political program under the title Germany after Hitler, The Completion of the Democratic Revolution (Um die Vollendung der demokratischen Revolution) for criticism and discussion. He is now engaged in re-writing this program on the basis of these discussions.

This document represents in many ways the most realistic analysis of the situation that has yet emerged from the organized sector of the German emigration. Hagen no longer shares the naïve optimism of the London Social Democrats to the effect that the United Nations will support the Social Democratic Party as "the only honorable democratic movement in Germany". The total defeat of Germany implies total military occupation and a German revolution, if there is to be a revolution, that will depend on the tolerance or support of Great Britain, the United States, and above all of Soviet Russia. Hagen proceeds on the assumption that Russia as the strongest continental Power will support only such a German revolution which would be in the undoubted interest of Russian reconstruction and Russian hegemony. For this reason he is profoundly skeptical of the democratic character of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943. Unreserved confidence could be reposed in such an appeal only if a joint United Nations support guaranteed the genuinely democratic character of such a German revolution. Since the victorious Stalin will scarcely surrender his twenty-five year old opposition to Social Democracy, no democratic and Socialist German revolution can expect any active assistance from Russia. Hagen is thoroughly convinced that if the program of the Free German Manifesto is put into effect, he himself

as a renegade Communist will never be permitted to return to Germany. 1/ No German Social Democrat, he thinks, would survive such a revolution. Even national self-determination would be lost, and Germany would be developed in accordance with Russian interests.

Hagen further contends that Great Britain and the United States cannot be expected to support a genuinely Socialist revolution in Germany. Both Powers are primarily interested in European stability and might be expected to oppose any social revolutionary movement in Germany that could threaten this stability, even though democratization of Germany requires the disruption of finance capitalism and monopoly ownership. Hagen regards a purely western solution of the German problem as no less unfortunate than a purely Russian solution. Such a solution would transform Germany into a bulwark against Bolshevism and would merely strengthen the privileged and reactionary classes in Germany, the heavy industrialists, the higher civil servants, and the large landowners. Hagen expects the United States to observe a benevolent neutrality toward Russia, so long as the war with Japan continues. He thinks it unlikely that the United States will play a decisive role on the European continent; it will rather seek some arrangement that will prevent the expansion of Bolshevism to Germany. Once assured on this point, the United States will meet Russian demands in Northern and Eastern Europe.

Hagen, therefore, sees the most favorable chance for an autonomous German democratic development in a joint military occupation by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, in which all partners would share an equal responsibility. Provided the Allies do not intend to disrupt Germany territorially, which Hagen like every other German Socialist vigorously opposes, he is generally of the opinion that the greater the unity among the Allies the more favorable will be the opportunity for a democratic German development.

This, of course, is not and cannot be a substitute for the minimum program of a German democratic and Socialist party such as Hagen has in mind. He, like every other German Socialist who stands to the left of Grzesinski, Hoeltermann, and Brauer is convinced that the democratization of Germany

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1/ It has recently been reported that in connection with the German Section of the Free World Congress Paul Hagen has advocated the formation in the United States of a Committee of Free Germans. He stated that he wanted no Free German Committee after the Moscow pattern, controlled by Communists but a committee which would be representative of all the sections of the German political emigration, and headed by some person like Thomas Mann. Such a committee would include Catholics like Werner Thormann, the members of the German Labor Delegation, and even the people from the German American Emergency Conference, which contains some Communists and fellow-travellers. This is, to be sure, no Free German Committee on the Moscow pattern, but it is one which would include some Communists and fellow-travellers. By advocating their inclusion Paul Hagen has departed from the bahavior pattern laid down by the London Union. By advocating such a Committee he also betrayed signal lack of political imagination, for he should know that the German Labor Delegation would never indorse a movement of this description. Except for Sweden, no organized German Socialist group anywhere has gone on record as cooperating with German Communists.

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is impossible without a social revolution aimed at the heavy industrialists, bankers, large landowners, and high civil servants. So long as the Allies demand Hitler's unconditional surrender but recoil, as Russia does not, from the propaganda of revolution, Hagen thinks there is nothing to be done but to support the Allied war effort. He has convinced himself that, for the moment, the Allies are confident of defeating and occupying Germany without being compelled to have recourse to the incisive changes which constitute the minimum program of the German Socialist emigration and of the German Socialist underground movement.

Up to a certain point, however, Hagen insists on identity in the objectives of the Allied forces of military occupation and of a German revolution. If the United Nations execute their present occupation program thoroughly, they cannot do otherwise than perform some of the tasks of a revolution. All the most important sanctions of an army of occupation must of necessity be directed against the present ruling Nazi classes. If the Nazi criminals are thoroughly swept out of the civil service, business, and the Wehrmacht, if the Nazi party and its affiliated organizations such as the SA and SS and their monopoly business interests are thoroughly dissolved much of the work will have been done. Moreover, it is probable, he contends, that the occupation forces will seize German heavy industries and other monopoly property by way of temporary or permanent confiscation. However anti-revolutionary the Allied occupation may be, it will restore civil liberties and freedom of political discussion.

IX. GERMAN SOCIALIST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR GERMANY.

When on 6 December 1942, the London Union took the decisive step to lay the foundation for a new united German Socialist party, it removed the most serious reason for the quarrel between the Sopade and the other Socialist groups. Once the Sopade had abandoned its legalistic position of representing the old Social Democratic Party and admitted that membership in the new party could not be determined by membership in the old one, a substantial basis for unity had been found. Owing to the conciliatory leadership of Enderle and Tarnow the quarrel had never been acute in Sweden. It survived only in New York because of a peculiar and local situation, but here, too, the quarrel will lose its importance once the London decisions filter down to the rank and file of former Social Democrats. So long as intellectual leadership among German Socialists remains in London, it is not likely that the decisions of the Union will be reversed. While the sharp competition for leadership remains, there exists today a substantial unity among all German Socialist groups.

This substantial unity appears to be greater still as soon as their attitude on the major problems of post-war Germany is singled out for special discussion. They profess both democracy and Socialism. All of them, including a majority in the German Labor Delegation, are in agreement on the necessity of a social revolution as a prime condition for the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany. They differ at most on the methods by which this is to be done. In one way or another this implies the nationalization of heavy industry, high finance, and the large landed estates, and a thorough combing-out of all reactionary and Nazi civil servants. "These measures," states the London Union in its resolution of 6 December 1942, "must be taken at once by virtue of the right of revolution." Concrete proposals for the execution of these measures must be prepared in the interim period immediately after the German defeat. The methods finally employed in expropriating and compensating former owners, the nature of future administration and control, cannot, it is argued, be determined by the German emigration but must be decided upon in Germany. Again, all German Socialist groups agree that this social revolution can be only a part of a more comprehensive program for the eventual conversion the Nazi war economy into a non-imperialistic consumption economy (Bedarfswirtschaft). Pending the achievement of this ultimate objective, states the program of the London Union, one of the foremost duties of German Socialists is to win over those large sections of the German middle classes which have been ruined by the Nazi war economy in order to make the new Socialist party the leading political force in the new Germany.

Most of these German Socialist groups realize that a social revolution cannot solve all the problems presented by German Fascist nationalism. They do not expect this aggressive German nationalism, which at present cuts across all class lines and has infected, as Tarnow himself emphasizes, even labor, to give up its struggle for power as a political and ideological force. All German Socialist groups, therefore, agree with the pacifist Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster on the necessity of a more or less permanent political disfranchisement of the members of the National Socialist Party as a condition for the success of the new German democracy. On the other hand

most Socialist groups are keenly interested in the problem of re-education. Among the numerous German Socialists who are now working on German post-war educational problems Dr. Fritz Karsen, a Social Democrat in New York and Minna Specht in London stand out. The London Union has already completed a plan for the reorganization of the German educational system. In Sweden Tarnow's group has a committee working on the special problem of the re-education of the German worker. While much of the work of these German Socialist emigres runs along the lines of the two British reports, recently published, the Chatham House Report and the Report of the Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and The Council for Education in World Citizenship, the difference between the proposals of German Socialists and those of the Allies is still very great indeed.

One may well ask what this substantial unity in principle and program among the various German Socialist groups is actually worth. These programs, such as we know them are still extremely vague and there is no assurance that when the debate over concrete measures begins the old differences will not reassert themselves. Broadly speaking, this unity is more effective on the left wing of the Socialist emigration than it is on the right. Experience has shown that in common discussions it is usually the left wing that triumphs. When Tarnow deliberates with the SAP, it is usually the point of view of the latter that prevails. In the same manner older Social Democrats such as Paul Hertz, Georg Dietrich, and Marie Juchacs usually yield to Paul Hagen. We may expect Stampfer and Brauer who are blessed with stronger backbones to continue their efforts to hold the London Sopade to a more conservative course, although there is no unity on this matter in the German Labor Delegation itself. At this moment such an effort is scarcely likely to succeed, for the program of the London Union was adopted only after six months of careful deliberation. This whole question of future unity is as much a matter of the basic political bent of leading personalities as it is one of ideology and program.

We have an excellent illustration of this in the case of Fritz Tarnow in Sweden. When Tarnow worked alone with his small circle of Social Democratic friends, he produced the monstrous plan for the transformation of the Arbeitsfront into a single national Trade Union Federation with obviously compulsory and authoritarian features. But as soon as he included August Enderle and the SAP in his deliberations, he promptly dropped these authoritarian features of his plan. Working together with Enderle, he completed the draft of an Appeal to German Labor which is to be broadcast throughout Germany "on the day after Hitler". Martin Krebs took the precaution to send this appeal in its final draft to Walter Schevenels, the Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who seems to have given his approval. Attached to this appeal for a single, voluntary, and democratic Trade Union Federation, and also approved by Tarnow, is an immediate program which is almost identical with that of the London Union and of Paul Hagen's Neu Beginnen. This program calls for the immediate socialization of the entire mining industry, transport, the entire banking and loan systems, as well as all the businesses whose owners have been financed by the Nazis or who themselves were active Nazis. Yet, when Tarnow informed Dr. Heinrich Bruening of his plan for the transformation of the Labor Front it was the first conservative draft

with its compulsory features that he transmitted. Again, we know that Tarnow is no less committed to immediate changes in the social and economic structure of Germany than the London Union, the New York Neu Beginnen group or even the German Labor Delegation. Yet, in the plan which Tarnow and his Social Democratic collaborators prepared for a German provisional government, there is no trace of any measure designed to effect a social revolution. In this document all the specifically Socialist objectives have been sacrificed to Tarnow's desire to cooperate with the Allied armies of occupation. This plan Tarnow also despatched to Dr. Heinrich Bruening after having written in collaboration with Enderle, the Appeal to German Labor. In the face of this conduct on the part of Tarnow, one becomes skeptical of the sincerity of the unity among the German emigres in Sweden. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that Fritz Tarnow, when free to follow his basic conservative bent, will be quite willing to sacrifice the more radical program of German trade unionists in Sweden to his personal ambition to play a larger role in post-war Germany.

This plan for a provisional German civil government (Die Situation nach dem Sturze des Hitlerregimes: Entwurf von Richtlinien zur Staatspolitik) is generally indicative of the conservatism of the older Social Democratic emigres. We may be sure that Enderle and the SAP were not consulted when it was written. For this reason alone it will bear a brief analysis. A military occupation of Germany, so runs the argument of this paper, does not exclude the possibility of a provisional government composed of anti-Nazi Germans. No liberal German political group should refuse cooperation with the occupying Powers, for, whatever the other purposes of a military occupation, the destruction of the National Socialist regime and the restoration of democratic liberties are among them. On the other hand, a provisional government composed of reliable anti-Nazi Germans should be welcome to the occupying Powers, chiefly because National Socialism cannot be uprooted by means of a military occupation alone. A thorough liquidation of National Socialism requires the voluntary cooperation of all anti-Nazi elements among the German people. No group, thinks Tarnow, is more useful for this purpose than the old Social Democratic Party. But middle class democrats and the churches should also be included in such a provisional government.

The thought that dominates Tarnow's entire plan is the impossibility of making any democratic regime, established immediately after Hitler's defeat, to function. For this reason he and his Social Democratic collaborators count on a military occupation of from two to three years. Without democratic institutions, political parties, or an instructed public opinion, no elections for a German national constituent assembly can be successful. Immediate elections can at best produce another Soldiers' and Workmen's council of 1918, which fell an easy prey to irresponsible and undisciplined demogogues and was unable to perform any positive function. Tarnow contends that it will take at least two years for a democratic party system to reconstitute itself and for the press to prepare the German public for general elections.

The dilemma that baffles Tarnow is the necessity of a strong provisional government that will not at the same time awaken the suspicion that it is setting up another dictatorship. The first government after Hitler must operate without a democratic mandate. It must be a very strong government, otherwise the problems of demobilizing the Wehrmacht, of re-employment and the change-over from a war to a peacetime economy cannot be successfully dealt with. This will be all the more difficult since the government will have to begin by eliminating all the leading civil servants in the central government, the states and the local communities. Until the clean-up work among Nazi organizations has been completed, thinks Tarnow, civil rights and liberties ought not to be restored or the institution of protective arrest be dropped. At the same time this provisional government must encourage the development of democratic parties independent of it. He proposes the following principle: democratic movements and their followers are to enjoy the rights of a democratic state, while all movements striving to set up a dictatorship are to be subject to the special laws of an authoritarian state. Tarnow leaves no doubt that among the latter he includes not only National Socialists but Communists. In his search for at least some democratic guarantees for this interim period Tarnow proposes a Reichsrat or a provisional parliament of 200 persons, nominated by German occupational organizations and appointed by the provisional government. In the composition of this body, which is to have only advisory functions, the various regional interests of Germany are to be adequately considered. Its "mandate" and that of the provisional government is to cease at the moment when a national constituent assembly convenes. In the meantime the provisional government is to exercise full legislative and executive powers, and is to cooperate with the occupying Powers in hunting down Nazi criminals and in eliminating all Nazis from the civil service and the judiciary.

It is obvious that Tarnow envisages a mild form of military occupation, not the total occupation after a total war of which Englishmen and Americans are thinking. While elsewhere Tarnow admits that the destruction of the National Socialist regime is no longer a purely German affair, in this plan he takes the position that it is largely a German problem. While in the Appeal to German Labor, written in collaboration with Enderle, he commits himself to the necessity of an immediate nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and the break up of the East-Elbian Junker Estates, there is no indication of such a measure in this plan. It seems clear that this plan, not the Appeal to German Labor, expresses Tarnow's real sentiments. It is the plan of a conservative Social Democrat, designed to appeal to a conservative, like Dr. Bruening, to whom it was sent, and to the conservative elements in the camp of the United Nations.

X. THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN EXILE

German Communists are the only group in the German political emigration that must be taken seriously. The German Communist Party is the most numerous, the most active, and effectively organized party within the entire German emigration. No information on the number of German Communist emigres in Russia or Sweden is available. With numbers far in excess of the 350 registered members they constitute the largest organized German emigre party in Great Britain. In the German Trade Union Center of Great Britain, which has approximately 600 members, they are reported to be in the majority. Because they are driven underground in the United States no basis for a numerical estimate is possible. They are to be found in considerable numbers in the German American Emergency Conference and Otto Sattler's German American League for Culture. Excluded from the United States, Mexico has become the center of the largest concentration of German Communists in the Western Hemisphere. Wherever one examines their local units, in Sweden, Great Britain, or Mexico, they exhibit close party cohesion, shrewd and intelligent leadership, and effective party discipline. The remarkable agreement in the political propaganda of the members and leaders of these local units is indicative of their close connections with one another and with the leader of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, Wilhelm Pieck.

A. The German Communist Underground (1933-1941)

The German Communist Party began its underground struggle against the Nazi regime with a great advantage over the Social Democrats. The cynical abuse of democratic institutions, which had contributed to the triumph of Hitler, shook the faith of broad masses of German labor in any kind of democratic regime. The failure of democratic processes in 1933 produced a curious kind of radicalism of defeat among all German anti-Fascists. Even conservative Social Democrats in exile for the moment, sported radical ideas. In Germany proper the conviction that the terror and dictatorship of Hitler could be successfully fought only by the counter-dictatorship of the Communist Party drove considerable numbers of former Social Democrats into the Communist camp. Moreover, the Communists had already perfected the techniques of underground operations and did not first have to acquire them painfully as was the case with the Social Democrats who were accustomed only to legal political activity. Finally, the example of the Russian October Revolution and the active moral and financial support of the Third International gave the suppressed German masses not only a program but hope.

The Communist underground struggle against Hitler was as heroic as it was reckless and costly. No party suffered greater losses at the hands of the Gestapo in the early years of National Socialism. Their local units were destroyed, re-formed, and liquidated again. So many thousands of them had been sent to concentration camps that it became steadily more difficult to replace their secret units.

For a time, it appeared as though the old Socialist-Communist division had lost its significance in Germany after 1933. After the destruction of democracy, there was little sense in speaking of a social and democratic reformism.

By the force of circumstances Socialists had become no less revolutionary than the Communists. Confronted with National Socialism, a fusion between the two German proletarian parties seemed to be at least a theoretical possibility. If, nevertheless, no fusion between the two underground movements was effected, it was because the differences in their methods and traditions were fundamental. The Socialists were contented with preventing German labor from becoming infected with Nazi propaganda, while the more active Communists were bent on getting the German masses into motion. The Socialists also regarded the Soviet Union as the strongest bulwark of labor, but they were jealous of their independence and retained a critical attitude on developments in Russia. For the Communists, who followed blindly the directions from Moscow, independent criticism of Russia was treason. The Socialists, perplexed by events and their own errors, sought new concepts and perspectives. But the Communists found a solution for every imaginable problem in the instructions that came from Moscow.

The Communists had placed the responsibility for the triumph of Hitler on the Socialists because they defended democracy when they should have appealed to the proletariat to fight for its dictatorship. But now instructions came from Moscow to fight for democracy and democracy only. They had denounced the Socialists for having cooperated with other bourgeois parties, but now, in deference to advice from Moscow, they called for a popular front with the middle classes. They went so far as to invite the cooperation of Catholic clericals, "honest" Fascists, and even the Nazi labor organizations. These instructions are followed so literally, that even the advocacy of Socialist reformism is now denounced as treason to the cause by Paul Merker in Mexico. It may be surprising in view of these capers, that there are so many extremely able men among the German Communists in exile. Whatever the explanation, the fact is indisputable.

The German-Russian Pact of August 1939, only accentuated the fierce antagonism between the two parties. Not long after this Pact had been signed, Walter Ulbrich, then head of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, announced that henceforth the principal task of the KPD was to defend the German-Russian Pact, and added that any German anti-Nazi at home or in exile who denounced this Pact was to be "unearthed". "Unearthed" in this connection could mean only denunciation to the foreign police or to the Gestapo. It is known that German Communists in Great Britain and Mexico did in fact denounce to the police as agents of the Gestapo honest anti-Nazi Socialists who refused to abide by this irrational party line.

B. German Communists in Great Britain and Mexico Since 1941

This was merely one of their temporary aberrations, for with the German declaration of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, German Communists became once again the most determined enemies of National Socialist Germany. German Communists everywhere now shared in the rising prestige which the heroic resistance of the Red Army reflected on the Soviet Union. In Great Britain in particular their forthright pro-Russianism gave them a popularity with certain sections of the British trade unions and of the Labor Party which left Social

Democratic emigres enraged and helpless. Wilhelm Koenen, the leader of the German Communists in Britain, and Hans Kahle were usually two or three steps in advance of the other German emigre groups in support of the British war effort. The Social Democrats reluctantly followed their lead, but usually with statements that lacked punch and determination. German Communists like Carl Becker, Hugo Graef, and Juergen Kuczynski were invited to participate in the meetings of the British trade unions and of the Labor Party. In 1942, Carl Becker was elected to the Executive Committee of the British Miners Union at its annual conference in Edinburgh. The British Sections of the International Transport Workers Federation and of the Metal Workers International also cooperate cordially with German Communists.

In Great Britain as elsewhere the German Communist Party is today playing a dual role. While remaining a close and highly disciplined group under the effective control of Wilhelm Pieck and the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, German Communists are devoting their best energies to a unification of all anti-Fascist Germans within Germany and in the German political emigration on the basis of a purely democratic program. By creating non-political front organizations, composed largely of non-Communists, they have spread confusion among the other exile parties and extended their influence far into the ranks of the unorganized German emigration which is everywhere in the majority. Because they do not desire to be identified as members of the German Communist Party but merely as anti-Fascist democrats, the Communist leadership of these front organizations is concealed with the most rigid caution. Usually their committees are not composed exclusively of Communists. Often enough, their leaders are authentic Communists without being registered members of the party. This is the case of Dr. Felix Boenheim, the secretary of the German American Emergency Conference.

These tactics have been most successful of all in Great Britain and Mexico. In Great Britain the Communist Professor Otto Kokoschka and an Executive Committee, all of whom are Communists, control the Free German League of Culture, which, with its 1500 members, is the largest German emigre organization in Great Britain. Likewise it is the Communist Professor A. Meusel who directs the Freie Deutsche Hochschule; the secretary and many of the lecturers of this institution are known to be Communists. This institution is an offshoot of the Free German League of Culture and its official aim is to educate German refugee youth in the spirit of international understanding and prepare them to support the British war effort and help to restore a Free Germany. Again, the Communist J. G. Siebert directs the Foreign Scientists' Section of the Association of Scientific Workers, and its secretary is Margarete Kuczynski, formerly employed by the KPD in Berlin, who is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Free German League of Culture and the wife of Juergen Kuczynski, one of the most prominent German Communists in England; she also is secretary of the War Aid Committee of German Refugee Women. An Executive Committee of thirteen, eight of whom are Communists, directs the Free German Youth which has five hundred members, and which is also an offshoot of the Free German League of Culture. It is interesting to note that latterly German Communists have been boasting of ever growing audiences of non-Communist German refugees in meetings sponsored by the Free German League of Culture.

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In Mexico German Communists have been even more successful in bringing a large number of non-Communist German refugees under Communist leadership on the basis of a purely democratic program. Here the Communists Paul Merker, Ludwig Renn (Baron Veith von Goelsenau), Erich Jungmann, and Egon Kisch have made the National Committee of Free Germans the central organization for all German Communists in the Western Hemisphere. It, too, has its youth sections, its women organizations, and labor committees, into which all anti-Fascist German refugees have been invited. With the assistance of such able German authors as Anna Seghers, Heinrich Menn, Alexander Abusch, Andre Simone (Leo Katz), this group publishes the monthly Freies Deutschland, easily the most brilliant magazine published by German emigres anywhere. By way of extending the circle of readers it now publishes a Spanish language weekly and a German language supplement to this, Der Deutsch-Mexikaner. Paul Merker and his friends of the Mexican Committee of Free Germans also control the Latin American Committee of Free Germans which is in a fair way of coordinating the anti-Fascist movements among Germans throughout the countries of Latin America. (The branches in Brazil and Argentina have recently been reported suppressed, but there remain the Alemania Libre of Chile, Uruguay and Ecuador, the Friends of Free Germany in Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Guatemala, of Cuba, and San Domingo.)

Nowhere outside of Russia is the position of German Communists more favorable than in Mexico. The Merker-Renn Committee of Free Germans enjoys the active support of President Camacho and the open approval of the Mexican State Party. Through their cooperation with the Mexican Minister of the Interior Merker and Renn take an active part in Mexican anti-Fascist counter-espionage, and their recommendations in visa matters for German and Austrian refugees are frequently decisive. Since the condemnation of the mail of this group by the United States Office of Censorship, Mexican diplomatic representatives in some of the countries of Latin America have assisted Paul Merker in his organization work.

On the surface there was now no substantial difference in the programs of the German Socialists and Communists. Both groups advocated revolution and democracy for post-war Germany. Yet, in Great Britain, the United States, and Mexico the implaceable feud between them continued. Paul Merker, indubitably the leader of German Communists in the Western Hemisphere, offers us the most instructive illustration of present Communist tactics in dealing with Social Democrats. Individually, he welcomes them in his Latin American Committee of Free Germans, but he persistently refuses to deal with any German Socialist organization on a plane of equality. He denounced his friend and collaborator Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, the president of the German American Emergency Conference, for having committed the stupidity of sending a letter of congratulation to Dr. August Siemsen who, as leader of Das Andere Deutschland in Buenos Aires, attempted to unite the German anti-Fascist Socialists in South America in support of an openly Socialist program in the Montevideo Conference of 30 January 1943. Paul Merker had previously tried the tactics of infiltration on Das Andere Deutschland. But when his agent, Balder Olden, a Communist and head of the Coordinating Committee of Democratic Germans in Argentina, failed in his efforts to persuade Dr. Siemsen to accept the leadership of his Mexican

group, Merker promptly shifted to the tactics of disruption. This same Communist Merker is now endeavoring to undermine the leadership of Karl Schulze and Arthur Gross, two left wing Social Democrats who organized a large group of German emigres in La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia. When his agent, Baender, failed to make sufficient progress, Merker called upon a Spanish Communist in La Paz for assistance.

In the meantime German Socialists like Gerhart Seger continued to denounce German Communists as fifth columnists in his Neue Volkszeitung, and Hans Vogel in London refused to sit at the same conference table with Wilhelm Koenen. Following the lead of Harold Laski in the January 1943, issue of The Left News, the German Social Democratic Party demanded the dissolution of the Comintern. In May 1943, this wish was fulfilled when the Central Committee of the Communist International declared its own dissolution.

C. The Dissolution of the Comintern

We are interested in this event only insofar as it concerns the German Communist Party. The immediate and obvious motive for this dissolution was the documentation of the Soviet Union's solidarity with the United Nations. But there were a number of other motives, both remote and immediate, that should be considered in a discussion of the German Communist Party. First among these is Stalin's famous decision that it was possible to develop a Soviet Socialism in Russia without any regard to what happened elsewhere in the world. This decision, it is said, marks the beginning of the end of the Comintern. Henceforth the Communist parties degenerated into mere instruments of the Russian Foreign Office. But at the last Congress of the Communist International in 1935, it was decided that the Executive Committee should "proceed from the concrete situation and the particular conditions in every country, and should make it a rule not to intervene directly in matters pertaining to the organization of Communist parties."

To the charge that the Russians did not act on this new policy, they have good replies ready at hand. Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda was already so successful, it is generally argued, that Communist collaboration in popular front parties came too late. To the appeasement of the Western democracies from the Spanish Civil War to Munich in 1938, Russia replied by the Soviet-German Pact of August 1939. In other words, the execution of this new Russian policy with regard to the other Communist parties depended upon a constantly changing political situation and was acted upon only in the Spring of 1943 when the momentary situation required some Russian act indicating its solidarity with its new allies.

But by this time the Comintern had already become an encumbrance. In the conquered countries a complete agreement among all the democratic elements of the people to resist Nazi oppression could not be achieved, so long as the Communist element in any particular nation did not make its decisions in accordance with national requirements, but in accordance with orders issued by the Comintern which was assumed to be an instrument of Russian policy. The dissolution of the Comintern was to remove this difficulty.

More important, perhaps, is the special case of the German Communists which seems to have had an influence on the dissolution of the Comintern. The Russians were the first to learn, what has now become generally apparent, that the strongest support of the Nazi regime is the German fear of Russian Bolshevism and Russian occupation. The German Communists, once the most powerful section of the Third International outside of Russia, were less effective in opposing the Nazi regime in Germany than were the Communists of France, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It was no satisfactory reply to state that Gestapo control in Germany was more complete; there was a German national opposition to Bolshevism. If Leninism, despite its kinship with Marxism, could now be described as a native product of Russian revolutionary thought and action, why could there not be a genuine Deutscher Sozialismus -- a term so foully perverted by the Nazis? Freed from the strict orders of the Comintern, the KPD could adjust its program to the special requirements of German national conditions.

The dissolution of the Comintern has not entirely removed the dualism of the German Communist Party. The party remains as an organization without any change in its management and leaders. From a close study of the behavior of Paul Merker in Mexico it is clear that there is no more party-democracy in the German Communist Party today than there was before. Its policy is not determined by criticism and open discussion among its members, but by the dictatorship of the presidium of its Central Committee in Moscow. It retains the sympathy and the active support of the Russian Communist Party and of the Russian Government and is, presumably, subject to Stalin's dictatorship. On the other hand, in its policy, but in its policy alone, it professes democracy, a democracy stripped of the more obvious trappings of Russian Bolshevism.

Although this profession of democracy may be genuine, it is certain that not one of the existing German emigre Socialist organizations trusts them. It must be said, however, that there is a growing disposition among individual Social Democrats in Great Britain to believe that sooner or later they must bargain with the German Communist Party. But the great majority of German Socialists everywhere still cherishes the rooted conviction that German Communists regard them as their deadliest enemies.

D. The Free German Manifesto

It is scarcely probable that this skillful and eloquent Manifesto, signed by war prisoners and German emigres in Moscow and transmitted over the Moscow radio on 21 July 1943, will at once dissipate these doubts.

The origin of this Free German Manifesto can scarcely remain a matter of doubt. Of the thirty-four signers of the Manifesto, twelve are exiled members of the German Communist Party. Of these twelve, five were Reichstag deputies -- Pieck, Florin, Hoernle, Ulbrich, and Martha Ardensee -- and four are well-known writers and poets -- Johannes R. Becher, Willi Bredel, Friedrich Wolf, and Erich Weinert, the last named being chairman of the Executive Committee of Freies Deutschland. All of the others are prisoners of war, half of them officers. The Manifesto is a

document of the German Communist Party in Russia which, following the example of the Communist-led National Committee of Freies Deutschland in Mexico, constituted itself as the National Committee of Freies Deutschland in Moscow on 12 July 1943. This identity in the names of the two groups cannot be tossed off as a mere accident. Neither the Freies Deutschland of Mexico nor that of Moscow is composed exclusively of Communists. Both organizations are what, for want of a better term, we have called front organizations of anti-Fascist Germans with Communists in key positions. Both groups publish magazines with the same name, Freies Deutschland, which betray no trace of being Communist Party organs, the one published in Moscow even carrying on its masthead the red, white, and black flag of Imperial Germany. The conclusion is inescapable that Paul Merker and Ludwig Renn in Mexico and Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbrich in Moscow are hewing close to a line previously agreed upon. It has been suggested in very competent quarters that the entire project of the Free German Manifesto originated in Mexico and was transmitted to Moscow by the Russian Ambassador Oumansky in Mexico. It is just as probable, however, that Paul Merker has learned to speak the language of Wilhelm Pieck in Moscow.

If any further proof of the German Communist origin of the Free German Manifesto were needed, it can be found in the propaganda line of the local German Communist units in Great Britain and Mexico. The Mexican and London groups employed the same propaganda device in the Peace Manifesto of the Rhineland Conference, reported by them to have been held in Germany during December 1942. On this occasion also, so German Communists reported, a group of people from all walks of life, including also members of the opposition of the National Socialist Party, each of them a delegate for a group of anti-Hitler Germans -- Social Democrats, Communists, Trade Unionists, Catholics, and Protestants -- worked out a program for a new Germany which is almost identical with that of the Free German Manifesto.

The substance and argumentation of the Free German Manifesto are also in remarkable agreement with the statements which German Communists in Great Britain and Mexico have made during the past year. The only novelty about the Manifesto is that it was issued by the Central Committee of the German Communist Party itself. The Manifesto's plea for a "strong democratic power that will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar regime," is merely a repetition of the centralist position which the German Communist Party for more than a year has taken with reference to post-war Germany. Again, its defense of private property, lawfully acquired, and the "restoration of property to their lawful owners, plundered by Fascist rulers, the confiscation of property of those responsible for the war and war profiteers" is a restatement of the position taken by Freies Deutschland in Mexico from the date of its foundation a year ago. Finally, the commitment of the Manifesto to democracy, freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, of assembly, and to a free economy, presents nothing which German Communists have not said before.

The vagueness of the verbiage of the Free German Manifesto has provoked a universal skepticism as to its genuinely democratic character. The terms democracy, freedom of speech, of economy and of assembly, it is argued, are weasel words

that are perfectly compatible with the single-party totalitarian system now prevailing in Russia. It appears that this skepticism is excessive.

A comparison of the text of the Free German Manifesto with Paul Merker's Was Wird Aus Deutschland? published in Mexico City in February 1943, may serve to clarify at least some of the doubtful points. As the leading German Communist in the Western Hemisphere, the driving force behind the Freies Deutschland movement in Mexico, a close friend of Losovsky, and, possibly, an agent of the G.P.U., Paul Merker is in a position to speak with some authority as a German Communist. His booklet is not only in complete agreement with the program of the Manifesto, but presents the fullest exposition of the minimum program of the German Communist Party for post-war Germany yet published. The only difference between the two lies in the prominence of German army officers in the Moscow Committee and in the more conservative and nationalist tone of the Free German Manifesto. A close reading of this pamphlet reveals that whatever it is that Paul Merker is advocating it is not Russian Bolshevism in its present form. Merker speaks freely of private industrial property and private peasant landownership, and implies at least a competitive economy. He does, it is true, demand the dissolution of the great national German cartels, but advocates the creation of price and raw material cartels for smaller middle class industries. When he demands the nationalization of heavy industry, the national banks, and the large landed estates, especially those that lay east of the Elbe river, he asks for nothing beyond what German Socialists are also demanding. This, however, he adds, "is not a Socialistic measure, but a simple democratic act to break the power of the most reactionary groups in Germany." To say that the word "democratic" is employed here in a sense more compatible with its usage in Russia than in Western Europe, is mere quibbling. One should also hesitate to charge him with recommending a Russian practice when he advocates the conversion of part of the nationalized landed property of the large estates owners into state farms. State farms have a long and honorable history in Prussia.

When he writes about a national constituent assembly, elected by a secret, direct and equal ballot, about democratic representative bodies and executive organs, Paul Merker is precise and plausible. It is true that his discussion of political parties is a trifle mystifying. His assumption is that the political power of the reactionary and imperialistic elements of German society will be effectively broken by the nationalization of heavy industry, the national banks, the large landed estates, and the elimination of high civil servants. After such a social revolution, he contends, there will be no need for the Deutschnationale Partei or the Deutsche Volkspartei. It is obvious from Merker's discussion that labor, artisans, peasants, and the middle classes are to constitute the foundation of the new German democracy. He does not openly repudiate the Communist doctrine of a single-party dictatorship, nor does he speak expressly of a multiple-party democracy. But neither the Free German Manifesto nor Merker's discussion exclude such a multiple-party democracy. This interpretation seems the more likely in view of the recent statement by Wilhelm Koenen, the leader of German Communists in Great Britain, to the effect that after the war German Communists, not being strong enough to control post-war Germany, will cooperate with other political parties.

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If, for the moment, we take the statements of the German Communists at their face value, we must assume that since the dissolution of the Comintern the German Communist Party has recovered its complete freedom of action from Moscow with the latter's advice and consent. We must also assume that in effect this party has repudiated its doctrine of a single-party dictatorship and of Russian Bolshevism in its present form. It is true that their old leaders in Moscow have but lately advocated an international Communist revolution, but because of the impracticability of the latter, we are told that they have become democrats and German nationalists who say "Germany must not die." Democracy and nationalism are designed to make their program viable in Germany. It is fair, if perhaps generous, to assume that when they speak of a German democracy they mean a multiple-party democracy, based largely, according to Merker and the Manifesto, upon German labor, artisans, peasants, the middle classes, and the churches. If inveterately distrustful German Socialists criticize the Free German Manifesto as being too conservative and as not going far enough in the direction of a social revolution, German Communists can refer to Paul Merker's program which calls for a nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and of the large landed estates of the Prussian Junkers. German Socialists, it will be recalled, demand no more than this.

If these assumptions are necessary on the basis of their official statements, the question -- what then has become of the German Communist Party? -- must be answered. We are left to infer that it has ceased to exist as a Communist party -- at least for the moment. It remains as an organization of cadres composed of the old members of the German Communist Party who are struggling for the realization of the only viable program of democracy -- not Socialism -- together with all the anti-Fascist Germans at home and in the emigration. The structure and organization of the party itself remains unaltered. We have no evidence of any party-democracy among German Communists. There is no relaxation in party discipline. The mechanism by which the directives of the Central Committee of the KPD in Moscow are promptly registered in the local units of German Communists in Sweden, Great Britain, and Mexico operates too smoothly to permit any inference as to radical changes in the management of the German Communist Party.

For German Socialists in the emigration, who cannot forget Stalin's implacable war on Social Democracy, this is sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the reality of this change in program. To them the matter of party organization is crucial. For this reason they regard the dissolution of the Comintern and the Free German Manifesto as exceedingly adroit tactical maneuvers, no more. Paul Hagen and the Executive Committee of the American Friends of German Freedom issued a statement on 12 August 1943, to the effect that without the express guarantee by the United Nations, they have no confidence in the genuinely democratic character of the Free German Manifesto. A similar statement is now being prepared by German Socialist groups in Great Britain. But Socialist opinion can scarcely be regarded as decisive.

A discussion of the implications of the Free German Manifesto and of the subsequent propaganda of the Moscow Free German Committee for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is not part of the purpose of this paper. In any case, since the publication of the Moscow Pact on 2 November 1943 this question is in a fair way of being settled. Having committed itself to political and military cooperation, it is fair to assume that the Soviet Union will not embark on independent action with regard to Germany. Even if no complete agreement between Russia and its Western Allies with regard to Germany yet exists the mechanism by which such agreement can be reached is being set up.

For a time, indeed, it appeared that since Great Britain and the United States agreed not to recognize any Free German movement, whatever its political complexion, and the Soviet Union has in fact recognized the Moscow Committee of Free Germans, the Soviet Union had a policy of its own in this matter. But it is quite another matter to say that the policy of the Free German Committee is also the policy of the Soviet Union.

Except for its insistence on unconditional surrender and the liberation of Austria, the Moscow Pact is silent on the treatment of defeated Germany. For the rest, Stalin has repeatedly declared that the Hitlerite state and the Nazi army must be destroyed. It should also be remembered that Professor A. Farrin, writing in the Moscow periodical War and the Working Class, includes among the German war criminals not only Nazi leaders in the Party, the State, and the Army, but also the leaders of German finance and industry. What Stalin said on 4 November 1942, about the impossibility of destroying Germany and the foolishness of denying her an organized military force, is now subject to agreement among Allies.

Between such statements as these and the propaganda of the Free German Committee there still remains a wide gap. This propaganda is generally conservative and nationalist, to make it acceptable to German army officers who play so conspicuous a role in the Moscow Free German movement. In this propaganda the new Germany is to have a "strong and genuine German national government" in which the Wehrmacht, purified of course of its Nazi elements, will have a definite place. "We are opposed," states Major Herbert Stoesslein in the first issue of the Moscow Freies Deutschland, "to fomenting demoralization in the Wehrmacht. We do not intend to incite soldiers to abandon their arms and retreat in disorder..... We must avert at all costs any repetition of the events of 1918." "This German army," adds Major Stoesslein, "must be preserved at any cost and in full," for "the construction of a strong democracy will require the support of a strongly welded army led by officers who realize their responsibilities." This can scarcely be called a statement of Russian policy. The Free German Manifesto does not even contain a fair statement of the immediate objectives of German Communists such as we know them. We know that when a Russian or German Communist speaks of Fascism he includes in this term the imperialist elements of German society. For this reason Paul Merker finds it necessary to insist on the nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and of the Junker estates. It is significant that the Free German Manifesto does not mention such measures.

The conclusion seems unavoidable that the statements of the Free German Committee fall largely into the category of psychological warfare so far as both the Soviet Union and the German Communists are concerned. That this propaganda also contains elements of actual policy so far as the German Communists are concerned is plausible enough. In this case the immediate objective of German Communists is neither a Soviet Germany, nor, if we may accept Paul Merker's program as indicative, a Socialist Germany, but a democratic Germany purified of Fascist elements. It is impossible to say whether this is also the policy of the Soviet Union. The most that can be said with certainty is that the Soviet Union is supporting it as psychological warfare.

E. The German Communists and Psychological Warfare

But whatever the significance of the Free German Manifesto, it is effective psychological warfare. Among all the various German party groups in the emigration, it is only the German Communists who are waging effective psychological warfare against the Nazi regime. To German emigres they persistently repeat that the unity of all anti-Fascist Germans which they are seeking in the emigration is to correspond to the unity, already achieved, in the German underground opposition where the difference between Socialist and Communists has disappeared. So far as we can see they are employing the same argument inside Germany as regards the German emigration. This propaganda cannot be without effect on the gullible in and outside of Germany.

German Communists have also found the only effective reply to the Vansittartism of the German Fight for Freedom group. They contend that to say that Fascism is an expression of the German character is both to mistake the nature of Fascism and to underestimate its real danger. It is not the character of the German people, German Communists argue, which makes them willing tools of German Fascism, it is rather the character of Fascism which enables it under certain circumstances to turn any people, including the German people, into hordes of barbarians. Once Fascism has come to power in any country, the task of overthrowing it in any country is an extremely difficult one. If it is not to poison an entire people, it must be destroyed as a spiritual and physical force.

The German people, to be sure, are responsible for accepting the Nazi regime and its barbarities. "When we rightly praise the glory of the Soviet people," states Jurgen Kuczynski in the June issue of The Left News, "we must also speak of the shame and guilt of the German people." Never, he adds, in the history of mankind has a people borne so heavy a historic guilt. This is the appalling evil which Fascism has brought upon the German people. The SA and SS have deliberately trained all the worst traits in the character of their members, and these have succeeded in corrupting others, or at least, in making them silent partners in crime. Particularly since the beginning of the Russian war German Fascists have succeeded in training an army of thugs or of accomplices through silence. No one can doubt, says Kuczynski, the success of German Fascists in barbarizing the vast majority of German soldiers. This has been done with the premeditated purpose of erecting a wall of hatred,

fear, and shame between the peoples of the occupied countries and the occupying troops and civilian authorities. For such a wall would make fraternization almost impossible, and would, in case of revolt, drive the occupying soldiers to fight to the last, because they could expect no mercy from the peoples of the occupied territories.

Whether or not one accepts this argument as truth, it must be admitted that it is good psychological warfare. This formula, though onesided, has at least the merit of offering a door of escape to deserting Nazis. In their propaganda to Germany both the Russians and German Communists make a great point of these desertions from Nazism. Accordingly, Paul Merker has not hesitated to welcome Bodo Uhse, a former member of the Nazi party, into his Mexican Freies Deutschland organization.

XI. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

This memorandum was already completed when the report of the London Office of Strategic Services on the Political Alignment of German Emigres in Great Britain (Dissemination No. A-11395) became available. This excellent report is in many ways complementary to the present memorandum, although the latter is more comprehensive in its scope.

A. The Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and the Unity Program

On the basis of new information, the present situation of the original Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party, elected in Germany on 26 April 1933, is as follows. The London Sopade has now only two members of this original Executive Committee, Hans Vogel and Erich Ollenhauer. The third member, B. F. Heine, was not elected but subsequently co-opted by the Committee in Prague. The Social Democratic groups in the various countries have agreed to accept London as the official seat of the Party Executive. The members of the Committee in London were empowered to act as the administrative body of the Executive Committee as a whole. The German Labor Delegation in New York has two original members of the Executive Committee, Dr. Erich Rinner and Friedrich Stampfer. For the moment Dr. Rinner is inactive. Although Friedrich Stampfer retired from the Committee in 1935, he still considers himself a member. The New York Neu Beginnen group now has three original members of this Committee, Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz, and Marie Juhacs. There is a curious irony in the circumstance that the New York Neu Beginnen group, now that it has three members of the Committee, should latterly have reverted to the legalistic position once so characteristic of the Sopade in Prague.

This distribution of the members of the Executive Committee among the various Social Democratic groups in different countries is of some importance in view of the discussions on the program for a United Socialist Party that are now proceeding. It will be recalled that when Ollenhauer made his unity proposals on 6 December 1942, he expressed not merely his personal opinions, but presented the conclusions arrived at in common deliberations by all the member units of the London Union. These proposals were then accepted in a full session by all the members of the London Union. At the present moment two committees, on which prominent members and experts of all the member groups are represented, are working out the details of this program for a United German Socialist Party. From the London OSS report and from Ollenhauer's report to Stampfer on the activities of the Social Democratic Party in Great Britain, we know that a far-reaching agreement has already been achieved and that the prospects for an early publication of this program are now very good.

We have Hans Vogel's testimony to the effect that the German Social Democrats and trade unionists in Sweden, having already achieved unity among themselves, are strongly in favor of the London unity proposals. There are regular communications between the two groups on this matter. Since the Neu Beginnen group is adequately represented in the London

Union by Erwin Schoettle and Richard Loewenthal, the adhesion of Paul Hagen and the New York Neu Beginnen group may be expected as a matter of course. Indeed, the London Union is carrying out the very wishes which Hertz, Dietrich, Juchacs, Hans Hirschfeld, and Paul Hagen have been expressing for more than a year. The only opposition to the London unity proposals has come from the German Labor Delegation in New York, or rather from that faction of this body represented by Stampfer, Grzesinski, Brauer, and Katz. By accepting the unity program of the London Union, Stampfer and his colleagues argued, Hans Vogel and the London Party Executive had betrayed the trust reposed in them by the Social Democratic Party in its last Reichskonferenz on 26 April 1933. He contended that this program marked a surrender of the historic traditions of the Social Democratic Party. He and his colleagues desired no affiliation with the SAP, Neu Beginnen, and ex-Communists and they called upon their London colleagues to break off relations with these groups entirely. He accused Hans Vogel of being dominated by the Neu Beginnen group, and complained that in this new Socialist party of ex-Communists honorable Social Democrats like himself would be fobbed off with a mere "parents' portion" (Altenteil). In his vigorous defence of the unity program of the London Union, dated 14 March 1943, Hans Vogel accused Stampfer of forgetting and ignoring all that had happened in the past ten years. He retorted that when Social Democrats went into exile in 1933, they undertook not merely to represent a party organization but to defend the interests and ideals of the German working classes who, in their underground struggle against the Nazi regime, showed little concern for the 1932 membership of the Social Democratic Party but preferred their present collaborators among whom there are many former Communists. Vogel added that the Party Executive felt that it was supremely important to take active steps toward unity among the principal Socialist groups now if for no other reason than to prevent another murderous civil war among them such as the one that occurred after 1918. Events immediately after Hitler's collapse will have a lasting importance and any omissions during this period will have to be paid for bitterly. Vogel gave Stampfer to understand that the London Party Executive did not share the German Labor Delegation's bitter feud with the Neu Beginnen group. He thought that Stampfer and some of his colleagues must have been rather badly rattled to say that the London Union was controlled by Richard Loewenthal. He added that the Loeb-Geyer group had made the same charge, but contended that Neu Beginnen was the least active group in the Union.

Just what the future attitude of the German Labor Delegation toward the unity program of the London Union will be, it is impossible to say at this moment. Hitherto also the members of the Delegation have not used the financial dependence of the London Party Executive upon funds which come from the United States as a means of bringing political pressure to bear upon their London comrades. There were no ties attached to the thousand dollars which the Jewish Labor Committee sent to the London Social Democrats. At the present moment, the members of the Delegation are making efforts to obtain a much larger sum from the War Chest of the American Federation of Labor to enable the London Sopade to maintain a regular office and publish a journal.

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Agreement among all German Socialist groups on a detailed program for a United Socialist party presents no insuperable difficulties. But such an agreement now depends in large measure on the policy of the United Nations toward post-war Germany. Their fears lest Germany become an exclusive Russian sphere of interest must have been dissipated by the Moscow Pact of 2 November 1943. Ideally, they desire a Germany that will be no less friendly to the Western Democracies than to Soviet Russia. This, however, strikes a growing number of German Socialists in Great Britain, who are most sensitive to the political situation, as a counsel of perfection.

The fact remains that neither Great Britain nor the United States has recognized anti-Nazi Social Democrats in any form, not even as "allied forces," although Socialists here and in Great Britain have sought such recognition for the past two years. German Socialists everywhere have taken no pains to conceal their keen disappointment over this situation. In Great Britain they are more sharply critical of the policy of the American State Department than they are in the United States, where they seek to place themselves in the most conservative light. In Britain also their opposition to Vansittartists both among themselves and in the British Labor Party is stronger than their aversion to German Communists. Victor Schiff, until 1933 one of the editors of the Social Democratic Vorwaerts, recently expressed the opinion that eventually the German Social Democrats would march arm in arm with the USSR against what he called the Darlanites of the West. Recent reports indicate that a truce now prevails between the German Communists and Social Democrats in Great Britain. These reports show that friendly discussions between individuals from both camps are becoming more frequent. These reports also indicate that the publication of the Free German Manifesto of Freies Deutschland in Moscow has strengthened the hands of those groups that desire a closer cooperation with the German Communists. To be sure, these groups like neither the "conservative and nationalist" program of the Moscow Free German Committee, nor the prominence in this Committee of German military personnel.

It must be stated, however, that in the latest Free German Committee to be organized in London on 26 September 1943, Social Democrats do not play a conspicuous role. Again, it is the German Communists, Wilhelm Keenen, Prof. Alfred Meusel, Karl Becker, and Hans Flading who are the driving force behind this movement in Great Britain. The only Social Democrat to appear on the list of supporters is Karl Rawitzky, a former legal adviser of trade unions. So far as is known not a single member of the London Union of German Socialist Organizations participated in the meeting of 26 September unless it be Mr. Geiser, a trade unionist, who protested against the alliance between the Moscow Committee and German army officers. Once more it is the former German Democrats, who have little experience in dealing with German Communists, who are supporting the Free German movement in Great Britain. Frau Adele Schreiber who played a leading part in the meeting was a former Reichstag deputy of the German Democratic Party. Most surprising of all among the participants is the name of the conservative Dr. August Weber, a banker and former chairman of the democratic Deutsche Staatspartei. Dr. Robert R. Kuczynski who acted as chairman of the meeting is an economist and is now teaching in the London School of Economics. He belonged to no party under the Weimar Republic, but at critical moments

invariably supported the German Communist Party. This conspicuous absence of German Socialists in the Free German movement of Great Britain is significant. It indicates that the decision of Hans Vogel, the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and of the London Union not to deal with the German Communist Party until an agreement with Moscow has been reached is still considered as binding by the members of these German Socialist Groups.